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WHY IT IS GOOD TO STOP AT A RED LIGHT: 
THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND 
OBLIGATION 
BRIAN MCCALL† 
“Law, if it is law, is authoritative, and the authoritative is voice, 
voice heard.”1 
Throughout history, some have questioned whether the 
authority exercised by some over others is consistent with human 
nature.2  Is it possible for a law made by one human being to bind 
the conscience of another, or is such a claim merely tyranny?3  If 
such a power to bind to laws made by humans is justified, what is 
its scope?  The answers to these related questions explored in 
this Article are both descriptive and normative.  This Article 
explains the nature of authority and the extent of the obligation 
to obey the law as well as explains how the architecture of 
natural law jurisprudence explains and justifies both the 
authority and the obligation.  To introduce the subject, this 
Article begins by offering a preliminary definition of authority 
and obligation.  Part I then surveys some of the competing 
theories of authority and obligation and demonstrates their lack 
of an ontology and a satisfying justification.  Part II presents the 
classical justification for legal authority and obligation. 
Before commencing the discussion, the parameters of the 
questions can be narrowed somewhat by defining the terms 
authority and obligation.  Auctoritas, from which the English 
word authority is derived, is a “liberty, ability, [or] power” to 
† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Orpha and Maurice Merrill Professor 
in Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A., Yale University; M.A., King’s 
College University of London; J.D., University Pennsylvania. The author is grateful 
to Professor Jean Porter and C.G. Bateman for comments on a draft of this Article 
and to Mallory Irwinsky for her work as a research assistant. 
1 Joseph Vining, Law’s Own Ontology: A Comment on Law’s Quandary, 55 
CATH. U. L. REV. 695, 695 (2006). 
2 See 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 363 (Gwladys L. 
Williams et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1944). 
3 Id. 
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express one’s will as a “command, precept, [or] decree.”4  Yet, 
such a general definition would encompass the power or ability of 
thugs to order people to hand over their wallets.  Distinguishing 
authority from threats backed by force was one of the primary 
concerns of H.L.A. Hart in defining the concept of law.5  As 
Joseph Raz observed, justifying authority involves distinguishing 
authority to direct action from the mere power to direct action.6  
At the very basic level of a definition, it is apparent how the 
descriptive answer to the question of legal authority is 
inextricably linked to the normative claim.  That which 
distinguishes authority from threats backed by force, or 
authoritarian, is legitimacy.  The power or ability to command is 
a legitimate or justified power, an attribute lacking in the case of 
the gunman.  Authority involves both an ability to impose one’s 
choice of a law upon others as well as a normative justification 
for doing so.7  Yet, to constitute legitimate authority, not only 
must one have the power to command, but that power must also 
include a duty to obey on the part of the one commanded.8  
Obedience to the law involves conforming one’s actions to the 
requirements of the law.9  Legitimate authority entails an 
obligation to conform one’s action to the command in a way that 
the threat of the gunman does not.  The effect may be the same—
the completion of an action complying with the instructions of 
another—but the nature of that conformity is different.  In the 
case of the gunman, conformity may be necessary to avoid harm, 
but it is not normatively obligatory.  It is not an act of obedience 
to conform to the gunman even if it becomes prudentially 
expedient.  In contrast, the claim of authority involves more than 
4 Auctoritas, CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, A LATIN DICTIONARY 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1879). 
5 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7, 20 (3d ed. 1961). 
6 Joseph Raz, AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFICATION, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1985). 
7 C.G. Bateman, Sovereignty’s Missing Moral Imperative, 8.2 INT’L ZEITSCHRIFT 
30, 40 (2012) (“[S]overeignty denotes two main tenets which support its legitimacy. 
First, there must be a political body or person with the capacity to exercise power 
over a specific community and place such that no higher authority exists within its 
jurisdiction. Second, sovereignty must insist that a positive moral imperative is 
placed on the person or body executing such power in practice.”). 
8 See Raz, supra note 6 (noting that those claiming legitimate authority are 
correct “only if and to the extent that their claim is justified and they are owed a 
duty of obedience”). 
9 See id. at 7 (“I do all that the law requires of me if my actions comply with 
it.”). 
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a threat of harm making conformity expedient; although a threat 
may be added to the instruction of law to encourage obedience.10  
It is not the threat that makes the law obligatory.  The threat is 
legitimate if and only if the one giving the instruction is 
possessed of authority in contrast to mere force.  As Randy 
Barnett explains, “A lawmaking system is legitimate . . . if it 
creates commands that citizens have a moral duty to obey.”11 
In the pithy words of Joseph Vining, legal authority produces 
“willing obedience.”12  Willing obedience is not the same as being 
happy or pleased about one’s obedience.  It means being willing 
to obey even when one does not want to obey.  Although Joseph 
Raz would dispute a general duty to obey the law,13 he does 
understand the concept of authority as a power to give another 
an exclusionary reason for acting when one does not understand 
the reasons or when one would choose otherwise.14  If not morally 
obligatory, for Raz, authoritative law can at least give one a 
preemptive reason to act.15  As Philip Soper has noted, 
recognizing an authority preempts, in some way, individual 
choice, in the sense that a command or precept given by one with 
authority takes some degree of freedom away from deliberating 
personally about the regulated action.16  Soper describes this 
autonomy-limiting role of authority as a “content-independent” 
reason for action, meaning that the reason for action is rooted in 
the authority of the one commanding or enacting the law and not 
in the content of the command or law being correct.17  In other 
words, the power referred to in the definition of authority is a 
power to require others to act on the authority’s determination of 
the correctness of the content of the authoritative claim. 
10 See id. at 5. 
11 Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116 
(2003). 
12 Vining, supra note 1, at 696. 
13 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 
2009) [hereinafter RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW]. 
14 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 62–65 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) 
[hereinafter RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS]; RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, 
supra note 13, at 17–19. 
15 RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 35–48, 58–78; Raz, 
supra note 6, at 13 (“The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is 
a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons 
when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.”). 
16 Phillip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
209, 215 (1989). 
17 Id. at 217–18. 
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While Abner Greene argues that this preemption of 
individual determination requires justification, Hart and Kelsen, 
in contrast, proceed in their jurisprudence without providing a 
complete justification for legal authority but merely assume its 
presence in the system.18  Kelsen merely assumes the existence of 
a basic norm which he calls a “juristic hypothesis.”19  Hart 
acknowledges that without some minimal content, no person 
would have a reason to obey the law and no legal system would 
exist.20  Yet, he merely assumes the existence of this minimum 
content as a rational necessity without normatively justifying or 
rigorously defining it.  This lack of metaphysical justification is 
most obvious in his treatment of the Rule of Recognition,21 which 
he asserts exists simply because it must exist and thereby 
sidesteps any rigorous ontological treatment of this foundational 
rule and its causes.  Both Kelsen’s basic norm and Hart’s Rule of 
Recognition are used to ground their concepts of the legal system. 
Yet, the most that either thinker can do is simply posit the 
existence of such a lynchpin of authority as a logical necessity. 
Hart simply introduces the Rule of Recognition as that rule 
which tells you what rules count as rules.22  Hart offers no 
explanation for the origin of such a rule of recognition other than 
it just exists in every legal system.  Ultimately Hart’s analysis 
simply ends at an ultimate rule of recognition which has no rule 
to evaluate its own validity; it is simply “ ‘assumed’ or 
‘postulated’ or is a ‘hypothesis.’ ”23  A rule of recognition can 
“neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as 
appropriate for use.”24  For Hart and his disciples, the Rule of 
Recognition is simply asserted as an uncaused cause of legal 
18 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION 102 (2012). 
19 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, at xv (Anders Wedberg 
trans., Russell & Russell 1945). The author adopts Joseph Raz’s interpretation of 
Kelsen’s theory with respect to the origin of the basic norm. See RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 126. 
20 Hart, supra note 5, at 193–94 (“In the absence of [the minimum] content men, 
as they are, would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a 
minimum of co-operation given voluntarily by those who find that it is in their 
interest to submit to and maintain the rules, coercion of others who would not 
voluntarily conform would be impossible.”). 
21 Id. at 84–85, 92–93. 
22 Id. at 94. 
23 Id. at 108. 
24 Id. at 109; see also RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 69 
(arguing that the ultimate rule in a legal system has no rule to establish its 
validity). 
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systems.  It is merely a fact devoid of any metaphysical 
explanation or proof that a certain rule of recognition exists in a 
particular legal system.25  The basic norm and the rule of 
recognition are simply assumed as givens, and authority is 
therefore simply assumed to exist.  Even Ronald Dworkin, who is 
claimed by some as a proponent of moral reasoning in 
jurisprudence,26 simply asserts the justification of coercive 
authority.  For Dworkin, current adjudications are based on past 
political decisions, which are simply assumed into the system 
without justification.27 
The examination of authority in this Article makes the 
stronger claim that legal authority can be justified and not 
simply assumed.  Yet, even Raz’s minimalist notion of authority 
as a mere reason for acting requires some justification.  Why 
should the adoption of a rule by a political ruler present a 
particular reason for choice?  Thus, even Raz needs to identify 
the ontological and normative grounding of his minimalist legal 
authority to give exclusionary reasons.  This Article contends 
that the architecture onto which human law is layered justifies 
legal authority.  The authority of human laws can be justified 
and explained only in light of the eternal and natural law. 
Contra Raz, the concept of authority articulated in this 
Article necessarily entails an obligation located beyond the mere 
command of the one claiming authority to compel obedience to 
the command.  The power of authority in its essence is the power 
not merely to persuade one to choose an action one might 
otherwise not have chosen but, as Perry has defined it, the power 
“to change persons’ normative situations,” by which he means 
changing their normative situation by creating a specific 
obligation to act that did not exist prior to the authoritative act.28  
Authority in the strongest sense of the word is not merely a 
25 Hart, supra note 5, at 104–05. 
26 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, How Constitutional Theory Found Its Soul: The 
Contributions of Ronald Dworkin, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 1, 1 (Scott Hershovitz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2006). 
27 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93, 97, 103, 151 (1986); see also Brian 
M. McCall, Exploring the Foundations of Dworkin’s Empire: The Discovery of an
Underground Positivist, 4 J.L., PHIL. & CULTURE 195, 201–02 (2009) (reviewing
SCOTT HERSHOVITZ, EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD 
DWORKIN (2008)).
28 Stephen R. Perry, Political Authority and Political Obligation 2 n.4 (July 12, 
2012) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Legal Scholarship Repository). 
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claimed ability to superior knowledge of what should be done.29  
To hold authority involves more than merely repeating the 
content of a preexisting obligation for the purpose of clarifying 
and publicizing its content—although those possessing authority 
may do this as well.  The strongest form of the concept of 
authority involves a power to legitimately bring obligations into 
existence by choosing to enact particular laws.  This Article 
defines, delineates, and defends this strong form of authority. 
Stephen Perry offers a useful definition of this strong form of 
authority that is the subject of this Article:  “If a directive was 
issued by an organ of a government which not only claims but 
also possesses legitimate authority, then those persons who fall 
within the scope of the directive have an obligation to obey it. 
Because legitimate authority is moral authority, this obligation is 
a moral obligation.”30  The definition contains a criterion for 
distinguishing between what Patrick Brennan calls 
“authoritarian” and “authority.”31  The definition of legitimate 
authority creates a distinction between a subtle gunman, the one 
who clothes himself in the robes of a political ruler claiming 
authority but who, although possessing the power to compel 
compliance, lacks the power to create obligations to comply. 
Whereas most people can recognize the gunman when they see 
him, it is more difficult to recognize the gunman when he is 
clothed with the vestments of legitimate authority, when he 
commands from the Kremlin or the White House, but whose 
claim to authority is false.  By defining the precise scope of the 
claim to authority, it becomes possible to distinguish the 
authoritarian from the authority.  By claiming the obligation to 
be moral, Perry points to a criterion of evaluation outside the 
command itself.  It obligates by virtue of something beyond itself 
whereas the gunman or the authoritarian merely obliges by the 
force of his threats. 
One final definitional clarification is warranted.  This Article 
considers only a species of political authority, the power 
specifically to create or alter laws.  The definition of auctoritas 
included the power to create both commands and precepts.32  
29 See GREENE, supra note 18. 
30 PERRY, supra note 28, at 5. 
31 Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating Authority, in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY: 
SOCIETY, STATE AND CHURCH 163 (Patrick Brennan ed., Lexington Books 2007). 
32 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THEORY 100 (Mark Bevir ed., 1st ed. 2010). 
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Political authority in the broadest sense includes both of these 
powers.  Political authority includes the power to order 
individuals to act in particular ways.  The president may order 
the army to move to a specific location.  The governor may order 
the offices of a state to close on a certain day due to inclement 
weather.  Neither of these acts involves the creation of a law. 
Law involves the formulation of a rule and measure of human 
acts which, although capable of formulation at various levels of 
generality or specificity, are directed to a community, or a group 
within a community, to serve as a general guide to action—not 
an order to act a particular way at a particular time.  A law, as 
opposed to a command, transcends any particular individuals.33  
Laws, although capable of repeal, are written to apply beyond 
any particular individual at any point in time.  A formulated law 
is not directed merely to the living members of the community for 
which it is made but to future members—unless the law is later 
revoked.  A command, by contrast, is directed to compel action by 
one or more particular individuals at points in time and is 
intended to lapse when the commanded acts are completed.  The 
consideration of authority within this Article is restricted solely 
to the power to change normative positions by enacting laws. 
This limitation is not meant to deny the existence of the power of 
authorities to command but merely to distinguish the power 
which is likely subject to differing justifications and limitations. 
Austin and Hart, two jurists who have thought deeply about 
authority and law, seem to neglect this distinction within 
political authority.34  The following discussion is concerned solely 
with the authority to make obligatory law.  Part I examines the 
two general categories of arguments used to justify legal 
authority and demonstrate how they fail.  It concludes with a 
brief examination of two theories of authority which do not fall 
into either group and which come the closest to a real 
justification of legal authority, that of Joseph Raz and Stephen 
Perry.  Yet, even these attempts fail to provide a completely 
satisfactory answer. 
33 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 4 
[hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE]. 
34 See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 18–48; RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra 
note 13, at 11–19. 
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I. ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION
Innumerable attempts have been made in the history of
jurisprudence to justify the power of some people to make laws 
which others are obliged to obey and thereby change the others’ 
normative position.  Although there are many fine distinctions 
among the theories, they can be grouped into two major 
categories: consent theories and utilitarian arguments.  This Part 
summarizes the key features of each type of justification and 
demonstrates their inadequacy, both in the sense of the failure of 
the argument on its own terms and its failure to explain the 
ontological goodness of authority.  If the strong form of the 
definition of authority requires that those subject to the law 
should obey the law even when they believe their calculation of 
the best action is superior, a complete justification of authority 
must prove the ontology of authority by explaining its origin and 
causes.  It must demonstrate the good of authority in itself, and 
not merely instrumentally.  To assist in this evaluation, this Part 
has recourse to the criteria developed by Leslie Green to evaluate 
whether a particular purported legal system entails an obligation 
to obey its laws.  Although these criteria are not formulated to 
prove the reality and goodness of authority in the universal 
context, they are helpful when applied to particular communities. 
Stephen Perry has provided a succinct recitation of Green’s 
criteria: 
To justify the conclusion that there is, within a given legal 
system, a general obligation to obey the law, the supporting 
argument or arguments must, according to Green, show that 
this obligation is (i) a moral reason for action; (ii) a content-
independent reason for action, meaning a reason to do as the 
state directs because the state directs it and not because its 
directives have a certain content; (iii) a binding or mandatory 
reason for action, as opposed to a reason which simply happens 
to outweigh other relevant reasons; (iv) a particular reason for 
action, meaning a reason that arises only for the directives of a 
citizen’s (or subject’s) own state, and not for the directives of 
other states; and, finally, (v) a universal reason for action, in the 
double sense that it binds all of a state’s citizens to all of that 
state’s laws.35 
35 Perry, supra note 28, at 14. 
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Throughout the analysis of authority, these six criteria will be 
used as a hermeneutic for judging the success or failure of 
theories of authority. 
A. Consent Theories
When the natural law-based justification of authority,
described in the next Section, was rejected in the early modern 
era, philosophers and jurists not willing to abandon themselves 
to anarchism searched for a substitute.  They turned to a familiar 
area of the law: contracts.  Contract law is the law of voluntarily 
created obligations.  If successful, consent theory would satisfy 
the six conditions for authority since it provides a binding 
content-independent moral reason for obeying the law made by 
others universally applicable only to the members of the relevant 
community.  The reason for obeying the law would be the 
antecedent contractual promise to do so not because of its content 
but because one promised to obey the law.  The moral obligation 
to obey the law would be entailed by the moral obligation to 
honor voluntary contracted obligations—which if such a moral 
obligation can be proven it would support public contracts 
consenting to obey the law.  If the consent were valid such an 
obligation would be binding.  If the consent as given applied 
universally to all laws made at any time, the obligation would be 
universal and at the same time limited only to those members of 
the community made such by consent and not individuals 
consenting to different states.  Although the six conditions would 
be met, the problem is that consent theory has not been able to 
establish the existence of the requisite voluntary consent to a 
universal obligation to obey the laws of a particular legal system 
by each member of the relevant legal community. 
Contracts come into existence upon the freely given consent 
of the contracting parties.  From Rousseau to Locke, many who 
rejected traditional natural law saw a potential substitute theory 
in this basic act of voluntary consent.36  Legal authority and the 
entailed obligation could be the product of voluntary consent of 
the governed entering into a compact imposing an obligation to 
obey the law.37  But contracts only impose binding obligations on 
36 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 95 (Bobbs-Merrill 1952); 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT 152 (Penguin Books 1968). 
37 See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 14,  22. 
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the parties actually consenting thereto, and consent of the 
governed is, at best, a myth.  The consent myth has played a 
significant role in attempting to justify legal authority in 
America.  Americans must obey the law because the consent of 
“We the People” legitimized the U.S. government.38  America’s 
first president invoked this argument to urge obedience to the 
laws during his farewell address: 
The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to 
make and to alter their own constitutions of 
government. . . . The very idea of the power and the right of the 
people to establish government presupposes the duty of every 
individual to obey the established government.39 
Christopher Ferrara has exploded such rhetoric 
demonstrating that “We the People” was no more than a tiny 
minority of the people living in America at the time of ratification 
of the Constitution.40  According to Ferrara, 
no more than about five percent of the total American 
population at the time, or about 160,000 white male voters 
actually cast votes for delegates to the ratifying conventions.  Of 
these 160,000 probably about 60,000 were opposed to 
ratification.  Thus . . . it was . . . only a few hundred ad hoc 
delegates at ratifying conventions whose votes represented the 
will of about 100,000 propertied electors in a nation of some 3.5 
million people, not including the slave population.41   
Beyond this problem, how does this consent of a majority of five 
percent of the population hundreds of years ago express the 
voluntary consent of those living today?  As Randy Barnett 
quipped, “In what sense can a small minority of inhabitants 
presuming to call themselves ‘We the People’ bind anyone but 
themselves?  And assuming they could somehow bind everyone 
then alive, how could they bind, by their consent, their 
posterity?”42  Yet, these few hundred men’s votes, treated by the 
myth of “We the People,” are deemed sufficient to express a 
voluntary consent to be morally obligated to universally obey the 
38 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 11, at 115. 
39 George Washington, “Farewell Address” (Sept. 17, 1796), in Documents of 
American History, 169, 172 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed., 
Prentice-Hall, 1973). 
40 CHRISTOPHER A. FERRARA, LIBERTY THE GOD THAT FAILED 175–87 (Angelico 
Press 2012). 
41 Id. at 183. 
42 Barnett, supra note 11, at 123. 
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laws of a government that was ratified hundreds of years ago. 
No one living today was alive then to even be excluded from that 
elite electorate 
Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau recognized that the only way to 
justify legal authority—and an obligation on the part of each 
member of a society to obey the law—is through unanimous 
consent to this social contract.43  Yet, even this early pioneer of 
consent theory recognized his social contract was only a myth 
and not a real contract.  Unlike with real contracts, which 
require a real objective manifestation to be bound by the 
contract, Rousseau admitted that requiring real universal 
consent was impossible and some form of tacit consent would be 
necessary to hold his theory together.44  The weakest form of tacit 
consent attempts to imply consent from other acts or passive 
states ranging from voting, residing in a territory, the failure to 
engage in rebellion,45 or the receipt by a resident of a territory of 
some benefit.46  The voting or political participation version of 
implied consent relies on the ambiguity of an act like voting 
which may not imply consent to the system but merely be an act 
of self defense to avoid a worse evil.47  As to passive acts such as 
living in a territory or benefiting from living in a society,48 these 
43 ROUSSEAU, supra note 36. 
44 Id. at 135, 153. 
45 Barnett, supra note 11, at 118. 
46 LOCKE, supra note 36, at ¶ 119. 
47 See GREENE, supra note 18, at 45. Greene also points out that participation in 
the electoral process, even if it could imply consent to the results of the election in 
which one voted, cannot be used for its claimed purpose of binding one to the 
electoral results in the past. Id. at 47. Jeffrey Reiman summarizes the failure of the 
so-called electoral participation theory of consent: 
[T]here is nothing inherently legitimating about the electoral process. If
anything, the electoral process is the problem, not the solution. . . . [T]he
policies that emerge from the electoral process will be imposed on the
dissenting minority against its wishes. And then, rather than answering
the question of legitimacy, this will raise the question with respect to those
dissenters. Why are the exercises of power approved by the majority
against the wishes of (and potentially prohibiting the desired actions of) the
minority obligatory with respect to the minority? Why are such exercises of
power not simply a matter of the majority tyrannizing the minority?
Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 127, 134 (Alan S. Rosenbaum 
ed., Greenwood Press 1988). 
48 See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR PLAY, THE DUTY TO OBEY 
THE LAW: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 107, 124–5, (Williamson A. 
Edmunson ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1999); A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair 
Play, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307, 307 (1979);  
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arguments run afoul of the principle that mere silence cannot 
bind an offeree to a contract.49  A car company cannot drop off a 
car in your driveway and say, “You owe us if we do not hear from 
you.”  As Randy Barnett observes, “It is still not clear, however, 
that one is obligated to pay for all unsolicited benefits one 
receives from others.”50  If taken to its logical extension, the 
receipt of benefits legitimizes slavery at least in the case of a 
beneficent master who provides enough benefits.51  At a 
minimum, the resting of a claim to tacit consent on the threat of 
removal of basic benefits flowing from communal life of any 
society would seem to constitute undue influence or even duress. 
Any attempt at implying consent by the receipt of benefits must 
prove that an easy and realistic option exists for exiting the 
purportedly beneficial system.  People are born into a territory, 
into a family, and have very little real choice to leave or rebel. 
The absence of a realistic, inexpensive exit option from the 
territory means that remaining in a territory is a poor argument 
for the presence of freely given consent.52  Thus, tacit consent is 
really a method for imposing the desired consent on those who do 
not affirmatively do so.  As Randy Barnett wryly notes, “It is a 
queer sort of ‘consent’ where there is no way to refuse.  ‘Heads I 
win, tails you lose,’ is the way to describe a rigged contest. 
‘Heads’ you consent, ‘tails’ you consent, ‘didn’t flip the coin,’ guess 
what?  You consent as well.  This is simply not consent.”53  The 
logical fallacy in all consent arguments consists in a faulty leap 
from the legitimate principle of consent in personal relationships 
and contracts to implied consent in impersonal groups.54  Rawls’s 
approach represents a desperate last-ditch effort to invent 
consent.  If real and tacit consent fail to exist, a “hypothetical 
consent” can be implied.  People have consented to that to which 
they ought to consent.  Rawls argues, “The choice which rational 
49 Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using 
“Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 502 (2008). 
50 Barnett, supra note 11, at 133. 
51 Id. at 136. 
52 GREENE, supra note 18, at 39–40. 
53 Barnett, supra note 11, at 120. 
54 See GREENE, supra note 18, at 81 (arguing that such a consent argument “is 
constitutive of intimate associations and one-to-one promise relationships, 
respecting the state or a state official as one would respect oneself is not constitutive 
of citizenship”). 
2016] BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 95
men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal 
liberty . . . determines the principles of justice.”55  Thus, “We the 
People” must obey the laws because Americans have 
hypothetically consented to what John Rawls says people would 
have consented to if he asked them, which in fact he never did. 
Consent has turned into hypothetical or imagined consent.  Paul 
W. Kahn makes explicit the imaginary nature of consent:
To see through the constitution to the popular sovereign whose
act it records is what makes it literally our constitution, despite
the fact that we, as finite individuals, neither wrote it nor
approved it.  This is not a matter of “implicit consent” but of a
social imaginary that grounds faith.  The constitution claims us
not because it is just—although we want it to be just—but
because it is a remnant of a politics of authenticity that we still
imagine as our own.56
Beyond the failure to actually prove the existence of any real, 
meaningful consent to legal authority, the consent argument fails 
for another reason of ontology.  Even if everyone could somehow 
engage in an evergreen free and voluntary consent, what proof is 
there that individuals possess the ability to confer such a power 
in the first place?  It is an ancient legal maxim that no one can 
transfer more authority than one possesses.57  The proponents of 
consent merely argue about the legitimacy of the process of 
passing along legitimate authority from “We the People” to 
lawmakers.  Yet, as Kelsen argues, legitimate authority must 
rest on a chain of authorization back to a source.58  Consent 
theory, if successful, merely proves that a power was passed 
legitimately.  It has no answer for the origin of the power to 
change others normative situation.  It has no answer to the 
question how one or more human beings can change the 
normative position of another creature sharing an equal nature. 
As Abner Greene observes, consent theory only works if you start 
with the premise that individuals possess authority to be given 
up in the consenting.59  Whence does the power to choose our own 
actions originate?  By focusing on the process of transmission, 
55 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
56 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 142 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012). 
57 See, e.g., Justinian, Digest 50.17.54 (“Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre 
potest, quam ipse haberet.”). 
58 See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 126. 
59 GREENE, supra note 18, at 36. 
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consent theories ignore the larger ontological problem of the 
justification of the power supposedly transmitted.  Stephen Perry 
glimpses this problem with acts of consent justifying the 
categorical power to obligate everyone to obey the law.60  Michael 
Moore explains that the failure of consent theories—or other 
theories based upon the will of individuals—lies in the 
unjustified move from the fact that sometimes individuals engage 
in obligation-creating acts—by making a promise for example—to 
the claim that individuals possess a limitless sovereignty to 
create obligations.61  This limitless sovereignty, which consent 
theorists assume resides in the individual, can then be 
transmitted by some real or fictitious consent.  Yet, as Moore 
argues: 
We should see these obligation-creating acts as part of our 
limited moral sovereignty, that is, the capacity which each 
person possesses to alter the moral landscape through his 
exercise of will. . . . That we have some such sovereignty at all is 
only because other obligation-creating norms permit us to have 
and to exercise such powers.”62  
Even if actual consent were possible, which it is not, it would not 
transmit a plenary obligation-creating authority since 
individuals lack such limitless authority.  Thus, consent theories 
of varying stripes fail to fulfill, at the very minimum, Leslie 
Green’s first and third criteria.63  Absent real unanimous 
consent, the theory does not establish a moral reason to obey the 
law as the authority supposedly conferred by consent has no 
ontological or moral basis, and consent theories lack a plausible 
reason why those who do not consent to the system in general or 
particular laws with which they disagree are obligated 
notwithstanding their lack of consent universally to obey the law. 
60 Perry, supra note 28, at 29 (“But the basic argument, which if correct applies 
to all ‘voluntaristic’ arguments for a general obligation to obey the law, including the 
argument from fair play, is this. Any argument that offers to justify the state’s 
claimed moral power to impose obligations cannot be conditioned on such 
contingencies as whether or not citizens (or, more generally, subjects of the law) 
have engaged in a particular kind of act—for example, the acceptance of benefits, or 
the making of a promise. This is so because any obligations that arise from the 
exercise of the power will be categorical, and as such cannot be conditioned on this 
kind of contingency.”). 
61 Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND 
MORALITY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 235–36 (Robert George, ed., 2001). 
62 Id. at 236. 
63 See Perry, supra note 28, at 11–12. 
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This lack of reasonable plausibility evacuates human law of 
the quality of rationality.  For consent theorists such as Thomas 
Hobbes, the starting point is not a universally valid rational law 
but rather each person’s right to self-preservation.64  Since the 
foundation of modern authority is not a rational law, the rule of 
the wise in which rulers deserve to make law because they are 
skilled in the love of truth, advocated by the ancient 
philosophers, is no longer considered the best regime.65  One does 
not rule by virtue of wisdom but by virtue of having received 
some volitional consent in the mythical state of nature.  Law no 
longer needs to be reasonable but simply be a willed act of the 
hypothetically consented to authority.66 
B. Utilitarian Justifications
Beyond consent theories, another group of jurists attempt to
justify authority on utilitarian grounds.  This term does not 
mean that all of these theorists are utilitarian in the strict sense 
of the term.  They all approach the topic from different 
philosophical premises.  What they all have in common is that 
they justify authority only instrumentally.  Authority is good 
because it is instrumentally useful or effective for achieving some 
other good.  Certainly there is nothing wrong with authority 
being efficient or useful in achieving other goods.  The problem is 
that usefulness does not justify authority as a real good.  If it is 
only instrumentally good, then authority cannot bind universally 
in conscience.  Doing so begs the question if in a particular 
situation obedience to authority is not useful or effective—even 
taking such terms in their most long-term perspective where 
obedience may not be useful in particular case but disobedience 
may diminish respect for law, including for the actor, and thus it 
is useful to obey in the one case, why should one obey the law? 
One should obey a legal authority in such a case only if doing so 
is in and of itself good.  To say anything less about authority may 
justify authority as useful but does not justify a universal 
obligation to obey the law because doing so is good. 
64 LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT IN HISTORY 185–86 (1953). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
98 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 55:83   
For the utilitarian justification, the presence of an authority 
to make laws that people are obligated to obey is useful for 
communities.  Society is better off with authority than without. 
Although the prior sentence may sound like a truism to all but 
the most committed anarchist, it does not really justify authority 
in and of itself.  It only justifies it as a less offensive alternative 
to anarchy.  Ultimately, although some utilitarians use moral 
language—and would likely object to being labeled utilitarian—
all among the wide variety of utilitarian theories fail to support 
an authority that gives a content independent moral reason to 
obey the law universally. 
The negative utilitarian argument—it is a lesser evil than 
anarchy—is rooted in the state of nature myth used by the 
consent theorists although it avoids the need for consent.  The 
state of nature is so dangerous and horrid that indiviuals are all 
better off with authority that can keep them from slipping back 
into the state of nature.67  One of the two main problems with 
this argument is that it is unverifiable.  Since it compares life 
with authority to a never existent myth, it can never prove its 
claim of life being better now.  The argument sets up a false 
dichotomy between life with authority and a nonexistent reality 
so it simply asserts the conclusion that authority is useful. 
Secondly, the theory fails criteria (ii) content independence, 
criteria (iii) a binding obligation and not merely the best among 
other reasons, and criteria (v) universality.  Since the end of 
authority, for the utilitarian approach, is merely avoiding a 
worse fate, its goodness is dependent upon the extent to which it 
is in fact the best means to that end in all cases.  The problem of 
legal cheating confronts the theory.  To use a classic example, if a 
person can know for certain that driving through a red light at a 
deserted intersection entails no risk of slipping into the dreaded 
state of nature, and if in fact that person can argue that arriving 
at the destination on time will contribute to a stable and orderly 
society—perhaps he is on the way to a shift as a police officer—
then that person can conclude that running the light is more 
utilitarian.  This example sweeps some complexity under the 
carpet.  There is the argument that not obeying the law wears 
down respect for the law, and thus it should be universally 
obeyed even when a particular instance suggests it is 
67 See GREENE, supra note 18, at 94–95 (summarizing this argument). 
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unnecessary in that context.  Yet, if it could be proven that an 
individual is a perfect utilitarian in that he will not lose his sense 
of respect for laws that are really justified on a case-by-case basis 
to avoid the slip into the state of nature then he has no duty to 
obey a law which does not instrumentally serve the given end. 
The negative utilitarian argument thus fails to bind universally 
but only when a particular law is in fact an effective means to 
avoid the slip into the state of nature.  It also fails to offer a 
content independent reason for obeying the law.  Each law is only 
worthy of obedience to the extent its content actually fulfills the 
utilitarian criterion of effectiveness. 
The more successful utilitarian arguments approach the 
problem positively.  The good that authority is useful for 
achieving is not simply avoiding a worse mythical state but 
making possible some positive good.  For John Finnis, authority 
is essentially utilitarian in that it makes possible the good of 
coordination.  First, Finnis argues that authority is needed 
because people are selfish and foolish in pursuing the common 
good.68  This argument is merely a reformulated version of the 
state of nature argument.  Without authority, society is at the 
mercy of selfish and foolish people.  Authority is needed to avoid 
this worse fate.  But Finnis progresses to a more interesting 
question, “In a community free from these vices, would authority 
be needed, or justified?”69  Finnis asserts that “more authority” 
may be necessary in such an idyllic community to solve 
coordination problems.70  Practical reasonableness will often 
support several reasonable and appropriate solutions to a 
problem.  Authority is needed to choose among them since 
unanimity of choice is practically impossible and consent theory 
is merely a form of unattainable unanimity.  Having an authority 
is the only other possibility.71  Authority is thus only an 
instrumental good “because required for the realization of the 
common good.”72  Although less morbid than the negative 
utilitarians—since Finnis talks about achieving a positive 
common good not merely avoiding a worse evil—in the end Finnis 
can only argue that authority is good by default.  Nothing else 
68 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231 (2011). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 231–33. 
72 Id. at 246. 
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works to coordinate effort towards the common good so authority 
must be good.  Authority is thus not good in the broadest sense in 
which Finnis uses the term—and for which he introduces the 
word value.73  To be such, it must be “desirable for its own sake 
and not merely as something sought after under some such 
description as . . . ‘what will contribute to my survival.’ ”74  
Consistently Finnis does not include authority in his list of basic 
goods.75  It is only good if it is the only means to achieve 
coordination which itself is only an instrumental and not basic 
good.  If it could be proven that either in a society of devils or of 
angels, coordination and the common good could be achieved 
without authority, then authority would lose its purpose and 
cease to be an instrumental good.  Finnis offers no real ontology 
for authority as a good in itself.  His theory of authority thus fails 
criteria (ii), (iii), and (v).  The only reason to obey authority is 
because it appears to be the only useful means of coordinating 
action.  Thus, to the extent authority fails to do so it is sapped of 
its moral authority and is thus not content independent.  As 
understood by Finnis, authority lacks universality in that it 
would cease to exist in the presence of other more effective 
methods of coordination. 
Although Finnis ultimately concludes that “God is the basis 
of obligation,”76 he denies that knowledge of God helps answer 
questions about obligation.77  Finnis clearly states that he does 
not ground his understanding of obligation in terms of conformity 
to God’s Supreme Will,78 although he admits that God is the 
ultimate origin of obligation.  As with the Eternal Law, Finnis’ 
ultimate conclusion is that God is practically irrelevant for 
understanding and justifying authority.  Such a conclusion runs 
counter to the entire Aristotelian tradition which holds that we 
must know things through their causes.  The ultimate causality 
of God for authority is dismissed by Finnis from necessary 
consideration. 
73 Id. at 61. 
74 Id. at 62. 
75 Id. at 86–90. 
76 Id. at 407. 
77 Id. at 405. 
78 Id. at 403. 
2016] BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 101
Stripped of a necessary ontology of its own, Finnis’s theory 
contains, for all practical purposes, no origin of authority, no 
transmission, devolution, or consent.  Tellingly, when Finnis 
quotes Fortescue’s famous discussion of authority, he can’t abide 
his statement that authority comes from “natural law” and 
changes it to “practical reasonableness.”79  If authority comes 
from natural law, that suggests it has an ontology, a history of 
devolution.  The next Part shows that Fortescue’s claim that the 
law of nature establishes authority, which Finnis dismisses as 
“lawyerly jargon,”80 is central to the ontological justification of 
authority.  For Finnis, there is only a fact:  People acquiescing to 
someone as an authority explains that there is authority.81  
Lawyers try to legalize the devolution of undevolved authority.82  
“[T]he sheer fact that virtually everyone will acquiesce in 
somebody’s say-so is the presumptively necessary and defeasibly 
sufficient condition for the normative judgment that that person 
has—that is, is justified in exercising—authority in that 
community.”83  Ironically, although Finnis goes to great lengths 
to claim he is avoiding the “is” entails “ought” so-called fallacy—
rather than rejecting its universal application as a fallacy—this 
argument simply asserts that authority ought to exist because 
people nearly universally do acquiesce to someone.  To this 
“scandalously stark principle” he adds two riders.  First, the 
person exercising authority has to comply with the constitutional 
provisions applicable to gaining the position at the time and 
place, if any.  Finnis’s rule is merely a reincarnation of Hart’s 
rule of recognition which simply exists without an ontological 
foundation or explained and justified origin.84  As long as one 
complies with the fact of the rule of recognition, authority is 
justified.  Further, Finnis recognizes that not all people to whom 
enough people acquiesce are deserving of authority so he has to 
borrow from consent theorists and create his own myth, like 
Rousseau and Rawls.  His is this: “when practically reasonable 
79 Id. at 251. 
80 Id. at 252. 
81 On this point, Finnis’s claim becomes indistinguishable from H.L.A. Hart’s 
argument that the fact of obedience to authority simply must be recognized. 
82 FINNIS, supra note 68, at 250. 
83 Id. 
84 HART, supra note 5, at 97–98 (stating the existence of an unstated and often 
unformulated rule of recognition which can have virtually any content as long as it 
is in fact used as a rule of recognition by a society). 
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subjects, with the common good in view, would think they ought 
to consent to it” then they should.85  Thus, a real community has 
an obligation to accept an authority when a mythic community of 
mythic people would have to do so.  When ought they accept an 
authority?  The full force of Finnis’s utilitarianism is on display 
in the answer to this question: “Authority—and thus the 
responsibility of governing—in a community is to be exercised by 
those who can in fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for 
that community.”86  This is another form of fictitious consent: 
People are deemed to have consented when they ought to 
consent.  They ought to obey simply because there is a fact of 
authority and there is no other way to get things done. 
Some scholars attempt to avoid the utilitarian justification 
by claiming that authority is valuable in itself; yet, upon closer 
examination their theory is at heart utilitarian.  Joseph Raz, 
although rejecting a universal obligation to obey the law does 
recognize that respect for authority is at least permissible.  Raz 
concedes that it is permissible to respect the law—at least in a 
good legal system—and if you do in fact respect the law then you 
may be obligated to obey the law.87  Thus, there is only a 
contingent duty to obey an authority; if you respect a particular 
legal system’s law then that respect is the source of your 
obligation.  Raz’s duty can never become completely content 
independent.  The contingent duty only arises if one judges the 
content of a legal system to be good.  A flaw in Raz’s argument 
can be observed by considering an analogy he uses, friendship. 
He argues there is no duty to have friendships but if one in fact 
has a friendship then he has a duty to act as a friend towards the 
friend.88  For Raz, there is no good in being a legal system or a 
good in law itself—regardless of content.  Likewise, there is no 
good in friendship itself.  He fails to see that although one may 
have no duty to be a friend to a particular person—or to be 
subject to a particular legal system—one does have an obligation 
to pursue the good of friendship—due to the social component of 
our nature—and law in general.  Friendship and, as discussed 
85 FINNIS, supra note 68, at 251. Finnis does describe this rule as only a “rule of 
thumb” as to when to refuse to obey someone who has garnered acquiescence leaving 
the reader in more of a quandary of exactly when authority is justified. 
86 Id. at 246. 
87 RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW supra note 13, at 250, 260. 
88 Id. at 253–54, 256. 
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more in the next Part, law are both good because they are a 
component of Man’s nature—specifically his social and political 
nature—for which Man has a natural inclination.89  Although 
there may be no obligation to establish a friendship with a 
particular person, one is obligated—naturally inclined by 
nature—to friendships and the attainment of friendship is a 
good—although there certainly can be degrees of goodness of any 
particular friendships.  As discussed more in the next Part, Man 
is inclined to law and therefore having law is good—although 
there are degrees of goodness.  For Raz on the other hand, the 
attribute of authority of law is not good in and of itself but only 
good if one chooses to respect a given legal system.  Raz’s 
conception thus clearly fails criteria (v), as the obligation is not 
universal but only effective for those who have chosen to respect 
the law. 
Raz’s justification is also not content independent.  Unlike 
the consent theorists, Raz does argue that legal authorities are to 
act based on reasons.  “All authoritative directives should be 
based, in the main, on reasons which already independently 
apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive.”90  It is 
notable however that Raz does not consider these reasons to be 
themselves legal.  The authority in issuing a directive is not 
necessarily relying on law but in general should be relying on 
some undefined type of reasons.  The work done by authority for 
Raz is simply to add pre-emptive force to the pre-existing 
undefined reasons on which the authority’s determination 
depends.  Raz develops this argument into what he calls a service 
conception of authority.  Justifying authority “involves showing 
that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons 
which apply to him . . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged 
authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, 
rather than trying to follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly.”91  Hugo Cyr demonstrates the utilitarian nature of 
Raz’s theory by characterizing the service performed by authority 
89 See id. at 53–77. 
90 Raz, supra note 6, at 14. Raz never claims that every decision must be based 
exclusively on dependent reasons but that they must mostly be. See id. at 16 (“All it 
[the Service Conception] requires is that it shall act primarily for dependent 
reasons.”). 
91 Id. at 18–19; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1986). 
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as merely a “resource-saving” service.92  Rather than having to 
spend the time analyzing all our reasons for action, we can 
simply obey the decision made by the authority.  Yet, as Hugo 
Cyr has pointed out, if Raz’s theory is taken literally there is 
really no resource saving because in order to know if we should 
obey an authority we have to conclude that they do in fact 
perform this service—they do primarily base decisions on the 
reasons that individuals would otherwise weight for themselves. 
Cyr explains, “Moreover, to actually determine whether or not an 
authority is worth accepting, according to the Service Conception, 
the subject will ultimately have to engage in the very 
deliberations that the ‘resource-saving’ feature of the Service 
Conception was meant to help the subject avoid.”93 
In making this evaluation the subject is analyzing the 
content of the authoritative decisions to see if they meet the 
standard of being primarily based on the reasons that would 
have been considered.  Thus, announced rules are not content 
independent; they rely for legitimacy on their content meeting 
this standard.  In undertaking this exercise to determine the 
legitimacy of an entity as an authority the subjects end up 
“destroy[ing] the authority function of that entity”94 because the 
subject has to engage in the same deliberations from which the 
authority was supposed to save him.  The only way to avoid 
destroying the utilitarian benefit of the authority saving decision 
making resources of subjects is to abstain from conducting the 
necessary evaluation of whether the authority meets the 
standard and accept the conclusion “that an entity has a 
legitimate authority over us would be ultimately a matter of 
faith.”95 
92 Hugo Cyr, Functional and Existential Authorities, 28 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 265, 
265–288, 271 (2015). 
93 Id. at 274. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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Stephen Perry summarizes Raz’s argument: 
Roughly speaking, the general idea is that, if one will better 
comply with right reason in a specified set of circumstances by 
allowing oneself to be guided by the judgment of another rather 
than by trying to act according to one’s own judgment about 
what ought to be done, then one is justified in subjecting one’s 
will to that of the other.96 
Perry argues that although Raz’s theory might explain the 
subjection to the directives of another on some occasions—that is, 
when subjection serves conformity with practical reason—it does 
not ever provide justification for the power of an authority to 
change people’s normative positions in and of itself.97  Essentially 
Raz’s position collapses into a form of greater knowledge defense: 
One who possesses greater expertise becomes an authority based 
on that expertise.  That authority is justified because it is based, 
although not exclusively, on what he calls dependent reasons,98 
reasons which are merely assumed by Raz to exist and which are 
not given an ontological, and specifically legal ontological, 
explanation.  Ultimately, any obligation to obey the law of an 
authority is rooted in the claim that in the ideal—that is, if 
acting as the experts they are meant to be—they are supposed to 
be accessing undefined dependent reasons that apply to their 
subjects.  Yet, as Perry points out, the fact that someone is 
morally obligated to conform to an expert’s advice due to the 
wisdom of that advice does not itself prove the expert has moral 
power to command the individual to follow that advice.99  The 
good advice of the expert contains its own reason for conformity, 
its inherent goodness.  The reason for conformity does not reside 
in the expert but in the advice.  As Perry observes, according to 
Raz’s view: 
96 Perry, supra note 28, at 54. Philip Soper also exposes the utilitarian basis of 
Raz’s service conception of authority:  
Raz designates his view the ‘service conception’ of authority: government 
exists because (and has authority just in case) it does a better job of 
advancing the aims of the governed (what ‘ought to be their aims’) than 
they could do on their own. The alternative conception might be called the 
‘leader’ conception of authority: government exists because (and has 
authority just in case) it provides necessary direction in default of 
agreement about what are the aims of the governed. 
See Soper, supra note 16, at 231–32. 
97 Perry, supra note 28, at 51. 
98 Raz, supra note 6, at 15. 
99 Perry, supra note 28, at 50–51, 57. 
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So long as I have reason to know that I will in general do better 
in complying with the reasons that apply to me in a given type 
of case by following the views of another person rather than by 
acting on my own judgment, it does not matter whether those 
views are offered in the form of advice or in the form of 
directives.100 
Raz himself seems to concede that his theory is no more than 
the expert explanation of following authority when he admits 
that the conditions for the service conception are unlikely to 
obtain.101  In the end, the advice of authority may be useful to 
acting reasonably but it is only authoritative subjectively for 
those who respect a particular legal system and see its laws as 
expert advice worthy of respect.  In the end authority may be 
useful but it is not justified.  Raz’s theory fails the universality 
condition—condition (v)—because in Raz’s view, a legal directive 
binds except when it does not due to other reasons such as 
arbitrariness or violation of fundamental human rights.102  
Ultimately, Raz’s service conception of authority is merely that—
at the service of other undefined, preexisting reasons which 
already apply to people.  The authority is justified if its decisions 
are most of the time dependent on those reasons except if a 
particular decision violates other vague non-legal concepts such 
as “human rights.”  For Raz, authority may most of the time 
make someone more likely to act rationally, but the rationality is 
the good and the authority is only most of the time useful.  There 
is no particular good to authority itself. 
The two thinkers who come closest to avoiding the utilitarian 
trap and locating the justification for legal authority are Stephen 
Perry and Randy Barnett.  Perry’s value theory of authority 
appears to transcend utilitarianism and sound in substantive 
moral argument.  He argues that authority is a moral power 
conceived as a value based power.  His value-based conception 
argues that “[l]egitimate moral authority can only exist if there is 
something sufficiently good or valuable about one person being 
able intentionally to change the normative situation of another 
100 Id. at 66. 
101 RAZ, supra note 91, at 70, 76–78, 104. 
102 Raz, supra note 6, at 14; see also id. at 15 (“On the contrary, there is no point 
in having authorities unless their determinations are binding even if mistaken 
(though some mistakes may disqualify them.”). In other words, law should bind 
except when it should not for nonlegal reasons. 
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person.”103  “[T]he moral and conceptual core of the concept of 
legitimate political authority” is that “one person has practical 
authority over another if there is sufficient value in the former 
person’s being able intentionally to change the normative 
situation of the latter . . . .”104  Unlike Raz, Professor Perry 
recognizes that to justify authority as such, and not just the 
authority of a good system or a moral or legal expert, the exercise 
of authority must be shown to be a good or valuable. Professor 
Perry argues: 
One person A has a power to effect a certain kind of change in 
the normative situation of another person B if there is reason 
for regarding actions which A takes with the intention of 
effecting a change of the relevant kind as in fact effecting such a 
change, where the justification for so regarding A’s actions is 
the sufficiency of the value or desirability of enabling A to make 
this kind of normative change by means of this kind of act.”105   
Perry sees what utilitarian arguments miss, that the act of 
changing people’s normative positions must be explained as a 
good act regardless of its instrumental usefulness for some 
independent good.  The problem that ultimately turns Perry’s 
argument into a utilitarian one is that he leaves indeterminate 
this value that is authority.  He claims: 
[My value theory of authority] is not intended to be a 
substantive theory addressed to the justification problem, nor 
can it operate as such. It is not self-applying; further moral 
argument is required to determine what kinds of value (if any) 
will justify A’s possession of such a power, as well as to 
determine the sufficiency of that value. This information will be 
provided by particular substantive theories of justification.106  
Thus, in the end, the value of authority is utilitarian for Perry as 
authority is only valuable if it can be found to support 
attainment of some other undefined value.  In other words, 
authority is merely the best way to reach some other moral goal 
by imposing obligations necessary to achieve it.107  At most, 
Perry’s theory provides a hypothetical method for attempting to 
justify legal authority.  If it can be proven that there is a value 
103 Perry, supra note 28, at 33–34. 
104 Id. at 88. 
105 Id. at 31. 
106 Id. at 82. 
107 Id. at 64. 
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served by legal authority, then legal authority can be justified. 
To the extent that this conclusion frames the issue for 
consideration it is useful, but merely in such a modest capacity. 
Although using the language of moral justification, the value 
theory still reduces legal authority to a utilitarian role; authority 
is still instrumental to another undefined value.  Perry would 
probably accept this evaluation, as by his own admission he is 
only offering a conception of authority and not a justification of 
it, which he says must come from political moral theory.  The 
closest Perry’s theory comes to a real justification is in its 
functional or teleological argument.  The goal of the state is to 
“accomplish particularly important moral goals that states are 
uniquely suited, or at least particularly well suited, to achieve on 
behalf of their subjects.”108  A power which fulfills this function of 
states is good in that it is suited to the function.  Authority fits 
this function by “means of the normative instrument of a 
capacity to impose obligations.”109 
In the end, Perry’s argument becomes circular.  Authority is 
justified because authority serves the function of the state 
achieving important moral goals.  That is exactly what a theory 
of authority is supposed to justify, that another person or 
institution should direct individuals to or away from certain 
actions.  Perry thus only transfers the discussion to the realm of 
“moral political philosophy.”  If the function of the state as Perry 
defines it can be justified in this other epistemological field than 
authority is justified because authority fulfills that function. 
Authority is left unjustified other than this utilitarian 
conclusion.  As with the other utilitarian theories, this leaves 
criteria (ii) and (v) unmet since authority is only good to the 
extent its use or content actually fulfills the state’s purpose. 
Also, authority would not bind in a hypothetical situation in 
which it could be shown that some other instrument could better 
fulfill this function.110 
108 Id. at 10. 
109 Perry, supra note 28, at 10. Perry does not actually label his argument as 
teleological or functional but rather following Leslie Greene, he calls it the “ ‘task 
efficacy’ theory of authority.” Perry, supra note 28, at 10. 
110 As described in the next section, the traditional Natural Law explanation of 
authority meets Perry’s two value criteria of authority: the intentionality 
condition—there must be value in someone having the power intentionally to bind 
others—and the prospectivity requirement—the present expectation of future 
acquiescence rather than mere fact of later acquiescence. The value in intentionality 
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Randy Barnett skillfully exposes the inadequacy of consent 
theories of legal authority.  He keenly notes that even if 
universal consent were possible, which it is not, consent would 
only be meaningful if there were a real right not to consent.111  
Thus, even on the consent theorists own terms, something must 
pre-exist consent, the right to consent or not.  Barnett uses this 
realization to ground legal authority not in consent but in rights. 
The assumption that ‘first come rights, then comes government’ 
helps explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence 
of consent.  For a law would be just, and therefore binding in 
conscience, if its restrictions on a citizen’s freedom were 
(1) necessary to protect the rights of others, and (2) proper
insofar as they did not violate the preexisting rights of the
persons on whom they were imposed.  The second of these
requirements dispenses with the need to obtain the consent of
the person on whom a law is imposed.112
He explains, “Therefore, when we move outside a community 
constituted by unanimous consent, laws must be scrutinized to 
ensure both that they are necessary and that they do not 
improperly infringe upon the rights retained by the people.”113  
As perceptive as Barnett’s argument is in exposing the failure of 
consent theories, he fails to ground his rights come first theory in 
a solid ontology and ultimately succumbs to the utilitarian trap. 
First, he substitutes rights for consent in his legal ontology.  In 
the order of being first comes rights and then comes law which is 
legitimized through its respect for the preexisting rights.  Yet, 
Barnett fails to find an origin for the preexisting rights.  He 
merely assumes their existence and dispenses with the need for 
any particular content informing the rights on which legal 
legitimacy rests:  “One need not accept any particular 
formulation of background rights, however, to accept the 
conception of constitutional legitimacy advanced here.”114  If he is 
correct that respect for rights removes the need for consent, the 
conclusion begs the question of the nature and origin of these 
is that God intends that human authorities exist to make determinations of Natural 
Law. Prospectivity exists because it is expected that people should obey because 
there is a delegated authority which has been transmitted from the source of the 
legal architecture of the universe. 
111 Barnett, supra note 11, at 141–42. 
112 Id. at 142; see also id. at 145 (reiterating this two-part test). 
113 Id. at 142. 
114 Id. at 141. 
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rights.  Barnett fails to answer this question.  If rights are going 
to legitimize the power to coerce action independently of the 
content of the command, how can one evaluate the claim to 
legitimacy without knowing the content of those rights that are 
determinative in the justification?  Thus, ultimately his theory of 
legal authority is based in a pre-supposed abstract rule such as 
Hart’s Rule of Recognition and Kelsen’s basic norm.  Barnett’s 
rights simply exist without cause, explanation, or necessary 
definition.  They, like the rule of recognition and the basic norm, 
are an unjustified black box.115  Once the ontologically empty 
concept of rights is assumed, then Barnett falls into the 
utilitarian trap.  Laws are justified to the extent that they are 
useful to safeguard the preexisting rights.  Laws remain 
utilitarian for Barnett, but he has simply substituted rights for 
happiness or pleasure or whatever term the particular utilitarian 
chooses to employ.  There is no good in law itself.  It is merely 
useful to protect the assumed but undefined background rights. 
Ultimately, all the utilitarian claims to justification of 
authority as instrumentally good amount to unproven and 
unprovable claims that some group possesses some unique skill 
set that will allow them to manage society better than others for 
some purpose, value, or undefined set of rights.  As Alasdair 
MacIntyre has argued, this claim is merely a fiction created to 
justify the fact of the power of managerial bureaucrats over 
society.116  Essentially the utilitarian claim to legal authority is 
open to use by those in power or those seeking to overthrow those 
in power by simply asserting, “We are the best experts in law 
making and you are better off under our control.”  Such assertion 
lacks any justified reason for believing the claim to be true. 
Consent and utilitarian theories fail to justify the power to 
change people’s normative positions.  All the theories considered 
fail because they lack any ontological grounding; they fail to 
identify anything other than a myth to explain the origin of 
authority and they fail to articulate any goodness in authority 
other than its usefulness. 
115 At one point, Barnett switches his language from talking about rights to 
justice. Id. at 144. Justice might be able to serve as a source of obligation for action. 
Yet, Barnett fails to define justice as anything other than the rights he simply 
assumes to exist. 
116 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 75–77 (2d ed., Notre Dame Univ. Press 
2007). 
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II. THE NATURAL LAW JUSTIFICATION OF AUTHORITY
Having failed to find a satisfactory justification for authority 
in consent or utilitarian theories, this Part argues that 
traditional natural law theory provides a satisfactory grounding 
for legal authority.  This Part has two objectives.  First, it shows 
that the natural law justification provides ontology for human 
legal authority.  Classical natural law jurisprudence provides a 
home for legal authority within the architecture of law resting on 
a solid ontological foundation.  In doing so, this Part begins as 
Stephen Perry suggests by addressing the “ ‘existence conditions’ 
for a power to change through legal authority people’s normative 
position rather than on conditions that will justify the supposedly 
mediating conclusion that there exists a (general) moral 
obligation to obey the law.”117  After exploring the proof of such 
power’s existence, the obligation to obey the laws made by the 
authority is explained and can then be limited.  Second, this Part 
demonstrates that the natural law argument satisfies Leslie 
Green’s criteria for a successful argument for an obligation to 
obey the law. 
A. The Creation of Legal Ontology
The natural law justification of authority can be summed up
in the old saying: “All authority comes from God.”118  Pope Leo 
XIII noted that the notion of legal authority deriving from the 
people was a departure from classical Catholic jurisprudence, 
which held “the origin of authority in God as a natural and 
necessary principle.”119  Joseph Raz admits that all authority 
must be conferred by another.120  Raz explains that Kelsen’s legal 
theory recognizes the need for an external single norm to move 
from “is” to “ought” and validate all laws.  According to Raz, 
117 Perry, supra note 28, at 4. 
118 RICHARD FLATHMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 215 (Atheneum 1972). 
119 Leo XIII, Diuturnum, no. 5., available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-
xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_29061881_diuturnum.html (last visited 
July 29, 2016) (“[V]ery many men of more recent times, walking in the footsteps of 
those who in a former age assumed to themselves the name of philosophers, say that 
all power comes from the people; so that those who exercise it in the State do so not 
as their own, but as delegated to them by the people, and that, by this rule, it can be 
revoked by the will of the very people by whom it was delegated. But from these, 
Catholics dissent, who affirm that the right to rule is from God, as from a natural 
and necessary principle.”). 
120 RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 20. 
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Kelsen admits some natural law is needed to have any law.121  
Kelsen admits that without his basic norm as presupposed there 
is no law.  “[A]n anarchist . . . who denied the validity of the 
hypothetical basic norm of positive law . . . will view its positive 
regulation of human relationships . . . as mere power 
relations . . . .”122  It is the basic norm that saves Kelsen’s system 
from being Hart’s gunman.  But for Kelsen, there is no ontology 
for this basic norm; it is just an uncaused cause for the entire 
legal system which he has assumed to exist because it must 
exist.123  In Raz’s words, for Kelsen, “It does not make sense with 
regard to any basic norm to ask when it was created, by whom or 
how.  These categories simply do not apply to it.”124  Without 
admitting so, Kelsen and Raz have simply come to the same 
conclusion that philosophers reached thousands of years ago.  If 
the principle of origin of law is an uncaused cause, then that 
principle must be the uncaused cause of everything.  C. G. 
Bateman observes: 
[F]rom Hammurabi to Hadrian, and even on past to the
Hapsburgs, the only affective benefactor of sovereignty was, at
least in theory, the deity.  In societies where religion was the
fundamental framework of daily life for all classes, rulers, for
the sake of legitimacy, had to acknowledge that it was the God
or ‘the gods’ who had bequeathed their sovereignty.  In this
context sovereignty was never aggregately or individually
understood as solely attached to either the will or skill of
personages, it came from the deity.125
St. Paul expresses the same argument succinctly:  “[A]uthority 
comes from God only, and all authorities that hold sway are of 
his ordinance.”126  J.D. Goldsworthy concludes that only with God 
can morality successfully claim that “its precepts are 
authoritatively binding in a sense which transcends even 
enlightened self-interest.”127  His claim holds equally true for law. 
121 Id. at 124–25, 129, 132–33. 
122 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 413 (Russell & Russell 
1945). 
123 Hart’s Rule of Recognition is similar in this respect in that it must exist for 
the legal system to exist, but Hart offers no explanation of why or how it exists other 
than to assume it does. 
124 RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 126. 
125 Bateman, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
126 Romans 13:1 (Knox Bible). 
127 J.D. Goldsworthy, God or Mackie: The Dilemma of Secular Moral Philosophy, 
30 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 77 (1985). 
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Even if Michael Moore’s argument were correct, which this 
author does not believe to be the case, and society could have 
good without God,128 he fails to even raise the related question, 
can we have authority without God?  Even if Moore proves that 
there is good and that people should do good because of the 
reality of morality, such proof fails to explain why any person 
should have the power to change the normative position of 
another by determining what is good for him in a particular 
circumstance when good can be done in two or more morally 
ambivalent ways.  Socrates, unlike Moore, saw the good, God, 
and authority as intimately linked. 
For Socrates, it is not enough that kings or oligarchs, or even 
citizens, wield the largest share of political power in their 
states, it is whether that sovereign power is the product of the 
‘good[.’] As to the fountainhead of this notion of ‘good,’ like many 
of the theorists who ended up weighing in on sovereignty after 
Socrates, he appealed to God.129 
Even Emperor Frederick II, not the most pious of Christian 
rulers, felt the need to acknowledge in promulgating legislation 
for the Kingdom of Sicily the ultimate origin of law in God. 
“After Divine Providence had formed the universe, . . . [God] put 
[His rational creatures] under a certain law . . . .”130  The modern 
crisis of justifying authority emerged when the notion of legal 
authority became detached completely from God so that political 
theory could imagine the state as being sovereign in its own 
right, whereas the time of Constantine’s sovereign authority was 
“thought to be under the jurisdiction and control of God.”131 
In Kelsen’s language—and this may be the bit of natural law 
Raz admits Kelsen needs—the basic norm is therefore the 
Eternal Law, an omnipresent foundation or starting point. 
Whereas Kelsen merely asserts the necessity of a basic norm, 
which has no ontology other than to fulfill a need to exist to make 
Kelsen’s jurisprudence complete, the Eternal Law has a complete 
ontology, discussed in a prior article.132  The Eternal Law is the 
128 See Moore, supra note 61, at 236. 
129 Bateman, supra note 7, at 36. 
130 LIBER AUGUSTALIS [CONSTITUTIONS OF MELFI PROMULGATED BY THE 
EMPEROR FREDERICK II FOR THE KINGDOM OF SICILY IN 1231] 33 (James Powell 
trans., Syracuse Univ. Press 1971). 
131 Bateman, supra note 7, at 39. 
132 See Brian M. McCall, The Architecture of Law: Building Law on a Solid 
Foundation—The Eternal and Natural Laws, 10 VERA LEX 47–48 (2009). 
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only law, which is an uncaused cause since the Eternal Law is 
nothing other than the Divine Wisdom ordering the universe.133  
The Eternal Law legislates the ends of things, including legal 
authority and human law.  If we can find authority legislated 
into the Eternal Law, we will have found a source from which all 
subsequent authority can be derived.  Yet, we come to know the 
content of the Eternal Law not directly, but through our 
participation in the Eternal Law through the Natural Law.134  
Likewise we encounter the Natural Law not solely in the abstract 
but through the developing customary history of real political 
communities.  Thus, by dialectically examining the authority 
exercised in actual, historically developing communities, we can 
find the origin of authority in the Eternal Law.  In this sense, 
Leo XIII argued the principle that all authority comes from God 
is a “natural and necessary principle.”135  It is necessary since, as 
even Kelsen acknowledged, authority must ultimately derive 
from a necessary being or an uncaused cause.  It is natural 
because we come to know of its existence through the natural 
law. 
St. Thomas begins his consideration of sovereign authority 
by considering Man’s ends.136  By doing such, he begins with the 
Eternal and Natural Law.  The Eternal Law establishes the ends 
of Man’s nature.137  Those ends become known through the 
natural inclinations which direct Man.  Yet, as Jean Porter 
argues, even though the principles of Natural Law, “are 
accessible to reflective judgement,” their relative indeterminacy 
means they are not sufficient in themselves “to govern conduct or 
to provide adequate structures for social activities.”138  The 
principles permit a realm of choice among particular ways of 
conforming to Natural Law.  Individuals must make some of 
those elections, but others cannot be left to each individual.139  A 
133 See id. at 57. 
134 See id. at 56–57. 
135 Leo XIII, Diuturnum, supra note 119, at no. 5. 
136 THOMAS AQUINAS, DE REGNO, in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS bk. I, ch. i, 
p. 3 (A.P. d’Entrèves, ed., J.G. Dawson, trans., McMillan 1959).
137 See McCall, supra note 132, at 92.
138 JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW 81 (William B. Eerdsman’s Publishing 
Co. 2010). 
139 See Brian M. McCall, Decorating the Structure: The Art of Making Human 
Law, 53 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 27–28 (2014). 
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component of Man’s ends is living in society.140  The existence of 
communities is therefore commensurate with human nature.141  
Man is meant to live in a society.  Since a community is a 
heterogeneous organism, it needs a principle of order to unify 
it.142  Authority is therefore both “appropriate and . . . necessary” 
because in order to be effective in a social context, the 
determinations of Natural Law which affect the common good 
will have to be “public and . . . stable.”143  Yet, since the 
indeterminacy of Natural Law allows for more than one—
although not an unlimited—rational choice, there will be an 
element of contingency to the any particular election made—the 
right as opposed to the left side of the road, for example.144  As a 
result, Jean Porter concludes, “it must be imposed in some way if 
it is to [be] a cogent claim, having binding force within a context 
of human relations.”145  The nature of making particular 
determinations for a society requires that the election be both an 
act of reason—it must conform to the rational principles of 
Natural Law—and an act of the will—be an authoritative, 
binding choice among permissible possibilities.  “[A]uthority 
serves to bring a relatively final, public, and generally acceptable 
specificity to indeterminate rational and natural principles in 
such a way as to create a framework for shared activities of 
diverse kinds.”146 
B. From Necessary to Good
Yet, the explanation in Section A appears on the surface to
be utilitarian.  Authority is justified because it is necessary to 
make social life possible.  Yet, this appearance is only superficial. 
Authority is not only necessary, but also, as Porter says, 
appropriate and is in fact good.  Authority fulfills a particular 
need for public and definitive determinations to be made for 
individuals in a social context.  Yet, both that social context and 
the necessity that authority satisfies have been willed by Divine 
Providence.  The indeterminacy of Natural Law and hence the 
140 See McCall, supra note 132, at 83. 
141 Suárez, supra note 2, at 364 (citing Aristotle’s Politics). 
142 See HENRI GRENIER, THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY, III MORAL PHILOSOPHY 289 
(St. Dunstan’s Univ. 1950). 
143 Porter, supra note 138, at 81. 
144 Id. at 81. 
145 Id. at 81–82. 
146 Id. at 82. 
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need for authority is not accidental but has been intentionally 
written into the legal fabric of the universe.  Put another way, 
human authority was not strictly necessary.  The Eternal Law 
could have specified all principles of action in the Natural and 
Divine Law leaving no room for determination.  God chose to 
leave this task, in a sense, unfinished and thus intended the need 
that authority satisfies.  Unlike the scholastic jurists of the 
classical Natural Law tradition, early modern Natural Law 
theorists like Blackstone envisioned human law as being made 
by copying necessary specific precepts of Natural Law into 
human law.147  In contrast, the Medieval scholastics understood 
the relationship to be more complex; Natural Law, and even to 
some extent, Divine positive law,148 was indeterminate and in 
fact required human law makers to actively provide that 
determination.  Professor Porter explains: 
[R]ather than regarding social conventions as more or less
direct and unchangeable expressions of human nature, they
emphasize the need for processes of rational, communally
shared deliberation, in order to move from natural principles to
their conventional formulations. . . . These general principles [of
Natural Law] are accessible to reflective judgment, and yet they
remain relatively indeterminate, in such a way that they are
not sufficient to govern conduct or to provide adequate
structures for social activities.  Seen in this context, relations of
authority appear as appropriate and sometimes necessary
elements in the social life of rational animals.  The rational
principles of [N]atural [L]aw must be specified in order to be put
into practice, and yet these specifications cannot be left to
individual judgments; they must be generally accepted in order
to provide a framework for social activities, and that means at
least that they must be public and relatively stable.149
The indeterminacy of Natural Law is not a fault or failing of 
Natural Law that needs to be fixed by inventing the concept of 
legal authority.  It is an intentional indeterminacy legislated into 
the legal system by the ultimate legislator through the Eternal 
Law.  God wanted rational creatures to participate more actively 
than Blackstone’s idea of copying out pre-formulated precepts.  If 
147 Id. at 63–64. 
148 See id. at 75. Porter cites SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 
91, art. 3; Q. 99, art. 3, reply to obj. 2; Q. 99, art. 4 as demonstrating that even the 
Divine positive law leaves “much undetermined.” 
149 PORTER, supra note 138, at 81. 
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Natural and Divine Law explicitly contained all particular 
determinations of right action, there would be no room for the 
election of means—the realm of human liberty.  Human 
authority is necessary and useful—as the instrumental 
arguments of the utilitarians suggest—yet it is more than that. 
It is good because God, the author of law, wishes humans to 
participate in the making of laws that govern their communal 
activity.  He provides for the further specification and 
determination of general public precepts by one having care of a 
community, by particular human beings exercising law-making 
authority.  This authority ultimately resides in God but is 
delegated and shared with human agents through the intentional 
indeterminacy contained in the revelation of Eternal Law 
through Natural and Divine positive law.  To fully understand 
human legal authority in these terms, this Article returns to 
what has been established about Eternal Law and its relation to 
Natural Law and human positive law in prior articles.150 
The Eternal Law, although fixing the ends of creatures, does 
not fix for Man the means to those ends.  The Eternal Law 
legislates the course of these means only in general by 
implanting the natural inclinations.  The Eternal Law requires 
the cooperation of human agents in determining the particular 
election of proportionate means through working out 
determinations of the principles of natural law in contingent 
circumstances.151 
These particular determinations are made within a threefold 
order of authorities: the individual, the familial, and the 
regnative.152  The Eternal and Natural Laws leave some of these 
necessary determinations to each individual to determine.153  
Others are determined for individuals by the authority of their 
personal, not strictly speaking legal, superiors154—those 
possessing authority in an imperfect or nonpolitical community, 
that is, parents for children in a family.  Finally, those 
determinations that affect “the common good”155 are left “to the 
discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge 
150 See McCall, supra note 132; McCall, supra note 139. 
151 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2. 
152 See RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 99 (ISI Books 2003); see also 
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 3, reply to obj. 3. 
153 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 1. 
154 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 1–2. 
155 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2. 
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of others.”156  The first two orders are only analogous to law, 
which properly exists only in the third.  Why is the sanction of 
law better than each determining for himself—or each superior of 
a nonpolitical community determining for it—all the individual 
cases?  The first answer is that the common good requires it.  By 
definition, the individual cases which should be addressed by 
human law rather than individual decision are those affecting 
the common good.  Just as those decisions not affecting the 
common but only a personal good should be left out of human 
law, those cases which do affect the common good should be 
determined not by private individuals but by those having 
“spiritual or temporal charge of others.”157  Francisco Suárez 
demonstrates that such an authority is needed to govern any 
society.158  He explains, “[N]o body can be preserved unless there 
exists some principle whose function it is to provide for and seek 
after the common good thereof, such a principle clearly exists in 
the natural body, and likewise (so experience teaches) in the 
political.”159  A homogeneous body such as an animal has 
instincts which serve the unifying purpose of directing the whole 
animal to its end, survival.  In Man, the rational soul serves this 
purpose.  Thus, in the heterogeneous body of politics a principle 
of order must govern the heterogeneous parts because each 
individual in a society looks after his own cares and these 
sometimes are contrary to the common good.  Also, sometimes 
there are things that are necessary for the common good but are 
not directly pertinent all the time to individuals so not all will 
work toward them without direction.160 
Governed society thus provides for peace and order among 
people and families and for the avoidance and correction of 
injustices.161  Beyond the organic unity of the individual, the 
heterogeneous organisms of the family and a perfect community 
thus require a principle of order to govern determinations 
necessary under Natural Law to reach Man’s end.  Although the 
form and nature of the authority to determine rules of action 
varies from the individual to civil society, the source and 
156 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 108, art. 2, reply to obj. 4. 
157 Id. 
158 Suárez, supra note 2, at 365–66. 
159 Id. at 366–67. 
160 Id. at 367. 
161 Id. at 365. 
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principle is the same: the provision for human determination of 
principles of Natural Law provided by the Divine Wisdom in the 
Eternal Law.  God could have provided this principle of order 
directly, but he chose to provide for the participation of human 
agents—the individual’s reason and will, the personal superior, 
and legal authorities.  These authorities are good not by virtue of 
any internal cause but because they participate in the ultimate 
legal authority ruling the universe, God.  The third form of 
authority, to make laws for a community, is the subject of this 
Article and so it turns to consider its origin and nature. 
St. Thomas explains that when one is directed to an end 
exterior to oneself one needs a guide to direct to that end.162  The 
etymology of the word gubernator—one in authority of a polis—is 
related to the nautical term for a pilot,163 who is one who directs a 
ship to an exterior end, the port.  Since the end of the common 
good is external to Man, there is need for such a guide, an 
authority.  As a social being, Man’s individual end, the 
fulfillment of his nature, is inextricably caught up in the end of 
the society of which he forms a part, the common good.  Thus, a 
need for a directive authority in the sphere of determinations 
beyond those within the determination of the individual is part of 
the legal architecture itself and would be present even in a 
theoretical community of saints not affected by the “wounding of 
nature.”164 
Classical natural law jurisprudence understands legal 
authority to be existential rather than functional.  The good or 
end of a thing is the fullness of its being.165  Professor Hugo Cyr 
distinguishes the former type of authority as one in which those 
subject to it see their existence and identity as existentially 
connected to the authority.  He contrasts this type of authority to 
mere functional authority which exists solely for instrumental 
efficiency.166  Clearly utilitarian theories can only justify the thin 
functional form of authority.  Although consent theories may 
come closer to justifying existential authorities since the theory 
sees authority as the expression of popular consent, ultimately it 
162 AQUINAS, DE REGNO, supra note 136, at bk. I, ch. xv, p. 79. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at bk. I, ch. v, p. 25–27; SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, at I-II, q. 
85, art. 3. 
165 See McCall, supra note 132. 
166 Cyr, supra note 92, at 286–287. 
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fails to do so.  As argued earlier, the consent is only at best 
fictional.  Beyond its expositive failure, being rooted in consent it 
only justifies authority because it is useful or beneficial to the 
consenting parties.  The natural law tradition understands legal 
authority to be existential and an inherent part of a person’s 
identity as part of a common political community through which 
the perfection of human nature must be pursued by obeying the 
determinations of Natural Law made by those entrusted with 
care of that community.  It is not simply that authority makes 
life more efficient.  Authority is existentially connected to a social 
being and we are existentially connected to society by the natural 
inclination to live in society.  Without authority we could not be 
fully what our nature is designed to be.  As Jean Porter has 
observed, “[I]t addresses one of the pervasive needs of human 
life, since without a whole range of shared activities, we as 
rational, social animals could not live—fully, or perhaps at all—
in the way characteristic to us as a specific kind of living 
creature.”167 
Authority is thus more than a necessary evil instituted after 
the loss of original justice; ordered determination by an authority 
predates destruction of the Natural Law in us.168  The Eternal 
Law by fixing a social element in Man’s nature and by entrusting 
particular determinations to human agents, makes the presence 
of an authority, one charged with care of the social community in 
its quest for the common good,169 a good.  The making of 
determinations of law that guide toward the common good is the 
end or purpose of authority fixed by the Eternal Law.  A proper 
understanding of the necessity and goodness for human 
determination of Natural Law refutes Kelsen’s claim that 
knowledge of Natural Law would make human positive law 
superfluous.170  Far from being a “foolish effort at artificial 
illumination in bright sunshine,”171 the making of human law 
involves the rational selection among several determinations in 
the bright light of Natural Law.  Perhaps Kelsen’s dismissal of 
Natural Law resulted from his misunderstanding the classical 
doctrine’s explanation of the divinely desired indispensable role 
167 PORTER, supra note 138, at 82. 
168 AQUINAS, DE REGNO, supra note 136, at bk. I, ch. v, p. 25–27. 
169 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, at I-II, q. 90, a. 1. 
170 Kelsen, supra note 19, at 13. 
171 Id. 
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for human law to make determinations of the general principles 
of Natural Law.  The making of human law is a good:  It is the 
attainment of a natural end.172  Human society, or the social 
aspect of human nature, is naturally inclined to be directed by 
law.  Thus, the fulfillment of that natural inclination—the 
formulation of determinate laws—is good.  In the words of Jean 
Porter, “Authority thus shares in the goodness, the attractive 
power, and the rational cogency of proper to human life as 
such.”173 
C. From the Good of Authority to the Virtue of Obedience
Not only do consent and utilitarian theories fail to
adequately explain the origin of legal authority, but they also 
consider authority or the power to affect the normative position 
of others as at best neutral and at worst an evil, albeit a 
necessary evil.  Obedience may be necessary, but it is not good 
according to this dim view of authority.  Utilitarian theories find 
no good in this power to change normative duties and the 
obligation to obey but accept the fact as justified only to the 
extent that it can produce other goods.  Consent theorists start 
from the premise that authority restricts individual freedom and 
is therefore problematic.  This problematic interference with 
freedom that a duty to obey another person creates can then only 
be justified if freely given consent accepts it.  Obedience is 
justified only as an act of freedom through consent.  The 
understanding of authority rooted in the natural law tradition 
offers a much stronger ontology—one that not merely accepts 
authority as necessary but as good.  Obeying the law is therefore 
not only necessary, but also an authentic good commensurate 
with human nature.  Leo Strauss argues that since Man is 
naturally social and therefore the restraint of freedom is natural, 
too, and therefore it is good for Man.  Man cannot associate 
without restraint on freedom involved in a duty to obey.  He 
explains: 
172 Michael S. Moore conceives of the value of law in a similar manner by 
considering law a functional kind. See Michael S. Moore, Law as Functional Kind, in 
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 188 et. seq. (Robert P. George ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1994). Moore, however, does not locate the origin of the function 
in the Eternal Law. 
173 PORTER, supra note 138, at 133. 
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Man is so built that he cannot achieve the perfection of his 
humanity except by keeping down his lower impulses.  He 
cannot rule his body by persuasion. . . . What is true of self-
restraint, self-coercion, and power over one’s self applies in 
principle to the restraint and coercion of others and to power 
over others. . . . To say that power as such is evil or corrupting 
would therefore amount to saying that virtue is evil or 
corrupting.174 
The dim view of restraint as unnatural and evil is evident in 
Enlightenment authors such as Jean Jacques Rousseau175 and 
constitutes an often unstated premise of consent and utilitarian 
justifications of authority.  For this contrary view, restraint—and 
therefore every virtue—is corrupting of freedom.  Law involves 
restraint and this restrain is unnatural, at best conventional. 
For the classical tradition, however, restraint of action is on the 
contrary good and natural, in fact virtuous.  Strauss explains, “If 
restraint is as natural to man as is freedom, and restraint must 
in many cases be forcible restraint in order to be effective, one 
cannot say that the city is conventional or against nature because 
it is coercive society.”176 
Postclassical jurisprudence is therefore uncomfortable with 
and thus continually in search of a justification for a coercive 
authority.  The distinction with the armed gunman haunts Hart’s 
analysis.  The best they can produce is an assumed basic norm or 
rule that must exist to justify the existence of a legal system. 
Hart and Austin were wrong in concluding that various societies 
each need their own absolute, in the absence of which there 
would be no legal system.177  This assumption arises from the 
premise that law and authority are not natural and therefore 
only conventional.  In the absence of convention there would 
therefore be no legal system.  Yet, a legal order although making 
use of conventional elements is ontologically natural.  There is 
always a cosmic legal system by virtue of the existence of the 
ultimate sovereign, the Promulgator of Eternal Law.  There may 
be no specifically human legal system in a particular time and 
space—in a civil grouping in a state of anarchy for example.  This 
174 STRAUSS, supra note 64, at 132–33. 
175 See, e.g., ROUSSEAU, supra note 36; JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILLE OR ON 
EDUCATION (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979) (both understanding freedom as 
the natural state of man and restraint as a corrupting convention). 
176 STRAUSS, supra note 64, at 132. 
177 HART, supra note 5, at 65. 
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lack of a human legal system in a particular area would stem not 
from the lack of an unlimited human sovereign but rather the 
lack of someone with care of a community to make the necessary 
legal determinations of Natural Law for that civil society.  There 
is no need for a sovereign in Austin’s terms, but there is a need 
for someone filling the office of determination maker under 
Natural Law, or in the phrase of Jean Porter, a “minister of the 
law.”178  If such an office is vacant, there is no functioning 
particular human legal system in such area but a legal system 
still exists, albeit one requiring further determination.  There is 
always a legal system as no one is outside the Eternal, Natural, 
and Divine Law.  The need for a human authority arises from the 
intentional indeterminacy of Natural Law.  Unlike Hart, who 
lamented the indeterminacy “handicap” in law,179 this view of 
authority rejoices in the indeterminacy within the Natural Law. 
This indeterminacy is a gift of God providing the opportunity for 
us to participate in the divine action of making law by 
determining the Natural Law. 
The conforming of our individual actions to the 
determinations of those charged by the Eternal Law with this 
responsibility of making determinations is thus a fulfillment of 
an aspect of human nature.  Obedience to the law is thus a 
natural inclination in the sense discussed in a prior article.180  
Due to the social aspect of our nature, we have a natural 
inclination to obey the law.  According to the Thomist Jeremiah 
Newman, justice is good under the aspect of due, and legal justice 
involves a case where due arises under the divine or human 
law.181  Thus, doing what is due under the determinations of 
human law constitutes a good act because it is a legally just act. 
Aristotle argues that good government consists in two essential 
elements: good laws and the obedience of citizens to the laws.182  
St. Thomas treats the virtue of obedience as a species of the 
virtue of justice.183  Obedience is the virtue whereby individuals 
allow their free determination of actions to be directed by the 
178 See PORTER, supra note 138. 
179 HART, supra note 5, at 125. 
180 See McCall, supra note 132. 
181 JEREMIAH NEWMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE: HISTORICO-CRITICAL STUDY 
IN THOMISM 127 (Cork Univ. Press 1954). 
182 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1294a (C. Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2013). 
183 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 104, art. 2, reply to obj. 2. 
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command of another.184  Aquinas explains the naturalness of 
obedience to authority:  “Wherefore just as in virtue of the 
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need 
to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human 
affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors 
are bound to obey their superiors.”185  Not only is the power to 
make determinations affecting the common good derived from 
the Eternal Law, but the obligation to obey is also found in the 
Eternal Law through the Natural Law which contains a 
secondary precept that superiors ought to be obeyed within the 
scope of their authority.  Obedience to the law is thus a good in 
and of itself because one who obeys participates in the end of 
good government of society.  All laws which are just and ordained 
to the common good are binding in conscience.  The law binds by 
virtue of legal justice.  Its breach may in a particular case 
constitute merely a minor infringement of legal justice but it still 
impugns it.  Obedience to these laws is thus a moral act.  There 
is no such thing as purely penal laws—laws which do not bind in 
conscience but for which one must pay the price if caught—as 
some modern theorists have suggested.186 
This conclusion requires a different analysis of Joseph Raz’s 
traffic light example.187  He posits as a legitimate law the 
requirement to stop at a red traffic light.  He then assumes a 
case in which disregarding the red light will not result in any 
danger to anyone, including the driver, and will not diminish 
anyone’s respect for law or those who make it, including the 
driver’s.  Since in this case, disobedience would not affect any of 
the purposes of the law—specific and general—as Raz conceives 
of them, Raz concludes “that in this case or a similar case the 
utterances of authority can be held to be legitimate without 
holding them to constitute reasons for action.”188  Raz does not 
see that obeying the law, even in such a circumstance, is good 
because doing so constitutes a good act—a virtuous act of legal 
justice and participation in good government by obeying the 
particular determinations of the constituted authority.  The only 
difference between a normal case and this special case of a 
184 Id. at pt. I-II, Q. 104, art. 1. 
185 Id. 
186 NEWMAN, supra note 181, at 57–58. 
187 RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 13, at 16. 
188 Id. 
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deserted intersection is that fewer social consequences result 
from an act of disobedience in the deserted intersection.  For the 
motorist, however, he has forfeited the opportunity to practice 
the virtue of legal justice.  Thus, there is only a difference in the 
scope of the consequences flowing from running the red light, not 
a change in the binding obligation to stop due to human legal 
determination. 
Beyond the goodness of authoritative determinations in and 
of themselves, another good of obedience to legal authorities can 
be discovered in light of the obstacles to virtue created by the 
wounding of nature.189  Aristotle noted this good of obedience in 
his discussion of virtue.  His argument in favor of authority is 
based on the observation that virtue requires not simply 
understanding but action.190  It is not enough to know what is 
virtuous to be virtuous, one has to do it.  Some people, either 
through a gift of nature or good training, will act according to 
virtue once they hear an argument as to what is virtuous; but not 
all are this way.  Some are ruled more by their passions and will 
not be persuaded by argument.  They require an act of the will to 
be moved to virtue because passions respond more to force than 
argument.  Therefore, laws are needed both to urge people to 
virtue by directing to the good they can will themselves and to 
compel others, “for most people obey necessity rather than 
argument.”191  The Digest agrees that it is of the very essence of 
law to command.192  St. Thomas defines a command as the act of 
moving “by reason and will.”193  As was discussed in a prior 
article, law must be a dictate of natural reason whereby it guides 
the reason of those under the law to know the good.194  Since the 
wounding of nature affects both the reason and the will, human 
law cannot remain merely a dictate of reason—which would 
merely support the expert notion of authority.  Since passions, 
189 For a further discussion of the wounding of nature, see Brian M. McCall, 
Consulting the Architect when Problems Arise: The Divine Law, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 103 (2011). 
190 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1179a33-1181b13 (H. Rackham trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2015). 
191 Id. at 1180a41-42. 
192 See Justinian, supra note 57, at 1.3.7. 
193 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, pt. I-II, Q. 104, art. 1. 
194 McCall, supra note 139. 
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which can direct the will away from the true good, respond to 
commands not rational arguments, human law must also be an 
act of coercion. 
To understand this further value of authority it is necessary 
to discuss the interdependent relationship between personal 
moral virtue and the common good, which is the end of law. 
Although law is directed to the common good in contrast to 
individual or purely personal goods, the common good is related 
to individuals.  In the preface to Charles de Koninck’s work 
dedicated to the relationship of the common good to individuals, 
J.M. Cardinal Villeneuve summarizes the interconnectedness:
[The common good is] the greatest good of the singular, not by
being a collection of singular goods, but best for each of the 
particular individuals who participate in it precisely on account 
of its being common.  Those who defend the primacy of the 
singular good of the singular person suppose a false notion of 
the common good as if it were alien to the good of the singular; 
whereas it is natural and proper that the singular seek more 
the good of the species than his singular good.  Since the person, 
an intellectual substance, is a part of the universe in whom the 
perfection of the whole universe can exist according to 
knowledge, his most proper good as intellectual substance will 
be the good of the universe, which is an essentially common 
good. . . . It is true also that a person can perversely prefer his 
own singular good to the common good, attaching himself to the 
singularity of his person, or as we say today to his personality, 
set up as a common measure of all good.  Furthermore, if the 
reasonable creature cannot entirely limit himself to a 
subordinate common good, such as the family or political 
society, this is not because his particular good as such is 
greater; it is because of his proper ordination to a superior 
common good to which he is principally ordered.  In this case, 
the common good is not sacrificed to the good of the individual 
as individual, but to the good of the individual insofar as the 
latter is ordered to a more universal common good, indeed to 
God.  A society consisting of persons who love their private good 
above the common good, or who identify the common good with 
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a private good, is not a society of free men, but of tyrants, who 
menace each other by force, and in which the final head is 
merely the most astute and the strongest among the tyrants, 
the subjects being nothing but frustrated tyrants.195 
The common good is that external good or end common to all 
members of the society.  Attainment of the common good cannot 
be achieved separately from individuals pursuing their 
individual end or good because the common good of the society is 
constituted by the same end as individuals, the perfection of the 
aspects of human nature.  Since human nature involves a social 
aspect, the perfection of virtue of each individual is a component 
of attainment of the common good.  Thus, in pursuing the 
common good, the law has an interest in the individual moral 
determinations of the individuals of society.  As a social animal, 
Man works toward his individual good as part of a society, as 
part of a whole working to the common good of all.  Thus, part of 
the purpose of law in pursuing the common good is to assist 
individuals in making personal determinations conforming to the 
Natural Law.  It then becomes necessary to consider the nature 
of this relationship between law and personal determinations. 
Any human participation in the Eternal Law will be 
imperfect.  The act of determining individual cases to conform to 
virtue is difficult—involving an effort of reason.  In the words of 
St. Thomas, “[I]t is difficult to see how man could suffice for 
himself in the matter [training himself to be virtuous].”196  
Consequently, Aristotle and St. Thomas suggest recourse to a 
proven good or wise man.  As discussed above, those possessing 
the habit of justice, the wise, are more likely to be correct in 
particular determinations.  Their conclusions are more likely to 
correspond to the specific truths contained in the Eternal 
Wisdom.  Thus, contrary to modern liberal individualistic 
philosophy the determination of acts solely by autonomous 
individuals is not an ideal that would be preferable but for the 
practical need to coordinate choices.  Individual choice aided by 
recourse to the wisdom of human law is preferable.  The difficulty 
195 J.M. Cardinal Villeneuve, O.M.I., preface to On the Primacy of the Common 
Good: Against the Personalists and The Principle of the New Order by Charles De 
Koninck (Paris:  Université Laval Editions Fides, 1943), Sean Collins translation 
reprinted in The Aquinas Review, V.IV (1997), available at http://ldataworks.com/ 
aqr/V4_BC_text.html (last visited June 22, 2016). 
196 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, at pt. I–II, Q. 95, art. 1 at 48. 
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in making good determinations indicates that individuals need to 
look outside themselves for assistance when determining their 
own particular acts.  For this reason, St. Thomas explains that a 
system of formulated human laws should include general 
principles of action in addition to the particular determinations 
affecting the common good.197  Human laws include not only 
specific determinations but also deductions of principles from 
Natural Law.198  Particular individual decisions are aided by 
having recourse to general principles deduced from Natural law 
by a legal authority.  Although speaking about the relationship 
between judges and lawmakers, his analysis applies more 
generally: 
As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), “it is better that all things 
be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges”: and this 
for three reasons.  First, because it is easier to find a few wise 
men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who 
would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.—
Secondly, because those who make laws consider long 
beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each 
single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is 
easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances 
into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact.—
Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future 
events; whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things 
present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or 
some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted. 
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in 
every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was 
necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to 
judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of 
men.199 
Note, this is a tempered assessment of the question.  St. Thomas 
does leave room for some “few” case by case determinations but 
argues that “whenever possible,” there should be laws formulated 
in general by a few wise men who would, being distanced from 
human emotions which can distort the consideration of specific 
cases, be more likely to reach the just conclusion.  In a sense, St. 
197 Id. at I–II, Q. 95, art. 2 at 50. 
198 Id. at I–II, Q. 95, art. 2 at 50 (“[S]omething may be derived from the natural 
law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of 
determination of certain generalities.”). 
199 Id. at I–II, q. 95, art. 1, reply to obj. 2 at 49. 
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Thomas is stating an old legal maxim familiar to most lawyers, 
namely that bad facts make bad law.  If law is solely a product of 
unrelated case-by-case rulings of particulars by individuals, it is 
likely that the unique and potentially emotionally compelling 
aspects of the individual case will lead to a bad law, a bad 
decision.  Thus, ex ante formulation of a general rule can be more 
likely to be correct.  St. Thomas does not advocate the 
formulation of an all-encompassing omnibus code for “[c]ertain 
individual facts which cannot be covered by the law” need to be 
left to individual judgment.200  Alasdair MacIntyre uses the 
analogy of a craft to describe the development of virtue.201  One 
learning a craft must advance under the direction of a master 
who guides by virtue of his authority the transformation within 
the apprentice into one who has internally mastered the craft. 
Just as those learning the art of building need a teacher to guide 
the development of their habit, the community needs an 
authority to guide the development of individual choices.  Laws 
that contain deductions of general principles from Natural Law 
guide individuals without completely determining individual 
actions, leaving the final choices of action to individuals within 
the bounds of the general principles.  Such laws generally 
prescribe virtue rather than prohibit vice.  In this sense, human 
law directs individual acts as well as coordinating those acts to 
the common good.  In guiding individual determinations, law 
does not exceed the bounds of its direction to the common good. 
Since assisting individuals in making good individual 
determinations is inextricably connected to the common good, the 
law orients to the common good even when it guides individuals 
in making particular determinations for themselves. 
For Aristotle and St. Thomas, the two major qualifications 
for one to assume legal authority in a regime are that he be 
virtuous—the wise—and that he act for the common good.202  
Thus, it is prudent to leave the determination of particular rules 
affecting the common good to those who are supposed to be wise 
200 Id. at I–II, q. 95, art. 1, reply to obj. 3 at 49. 
201 See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL INQUIRY: 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 60–64 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 
1990). 
202 This Article’s presentation of this claim is a summary. See ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS, 1094a-3, 1103a3-10; AQUINAS, DE REGNO, supra note 136, at bk. I, ch. i, p. 
5; bk. I, ch. ii, 11–13 for more details. 
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and virtuous, the ruling authorities, temporal and spiritual.203  
The reference to both temporal and spiritual authorities as 
instruments of human determinations is an important point to 
note for our time.  Both religious and civil authorities have the 
obligation and freedom to make particular determinations of the 
Natural Law within the appropriate spheres of their jurisdiction. 
Thus, not all laws enacted to aid individual moral determinations 
need be made by temporal authorities.  St.Thomas is speaking of 
authority in general, and he envisions a plurality of authority in 
distinct but overlapping spheres, overlapping in that they all 
relate to the same subject—individuals making determinations of 
actions under the Eternal Law.  Harold Berman argues that this 
plurality of overlapping jurisdictions was a central feature of the 
traditional understanding of legal authority.204  This conception 
differs greatly from contemporary visions of authority as 
monolithic and monopolistically controlled by a single human 
legal sovereign as Austin envisions. 
Thus, authority serves two distinct but related roles which 
can be summarized in the statement that authorities make laws 
which directly or indirectly affect the common good.  Some laws 
directly affect the common good by making particular 
determinations for actions so as to orient those actions to, and 
coordinate them with respect to, the common good.  Some laws 
also aid individuals in attaining their personal end, their 
personal good, by providing guidance in the form of deduced 
principles of Natural Law.  In such a way, the law indirectly aims 
at the common good by guiding individuals whose individual 
choices inextricably affect the common good. 
This insight provides part of the answer to Hart’s question of 
what distinguishes the coerced compliance with the demand of a 
gunman from the obedience to the law.205  First, the lawmaker is 
entrusted with the power to require obedience to a command 
which is a determination of Natural Law; the gunman is a self-
203 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, at I–II, Q. 108, art. 2, reply to obj. 4 
at 311. 
204 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 536–7 (Harv. Univ. Press 1983) (arguing that the 
nature of authority was “rooted in the duality of secular and spiritual authorities” 
and “the belief in the supremacy of law was rooted in the pluralism of secular 
authorities within each kingdom, and especially in the dialectical tension among 
royal, feudal, and urban politics”). 
205 HART, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
2016] BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 131
appointed commander.  The legal authority is empowered to 
command for the purposes of guiding individuals to actions which 
are oriented to the common good, a good which by its very nature 
includes the good of the individual commanded.  The gunman 
commands action which is oriented solely to his individual 
advantage and not to the common good.  Secondly, the power to 
command is entrusted to the legal authority from a superior 
authority, God and His Eternal Law.  God provides for the 
exercise of authority by those entrusted with care of the common 
good.  The gunman usurps authority for himself for the purposes 
of advancing his own personal good.  Even though both a 
legitimate authority and the gunman coupled their command 
with a threat of consequences for disobedience, the difference 
between the two is that a legal authority is given this power to 
command and threaten from a superior authority.  The gunman 
usurps the power for himself.  As Hart rightly argued, the 
presence of a threat of punishment is insignificant to legitimize 
authority.206  Yet, since Hart rejects the delegation of authority 
from outside a particular legal system, he is forced to ground the 
obligation to obey legal authority on the negative consequences of 
disobedience albeit defined more broadly than those of a gunman. 
Hart explains, “Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing 
obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent 
and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate 
or threaten to deviate is great.”207  Hart thus ends up basing the 
obligation to obey internally on social pressures to conform, 
resulting in no qualitative difference between law and the 
gunman.  The difference is only one of quantity.  The gunman’s 
threat is backed merely by himself and his gun; the law’s threat 
is backed by broader social pressure.  It is still a threat that 
makes a law obligatory for Hart.  The classical Natural Law 
explanation avoids reliance on threats of consequences as 
constituting the obligation to obey the law.  The threats merely 
remain as potential consequences of violating the otherwise 
justified duty to obey legitimate laws.  Obligation derives from 
206 Id. at 81–83 (showing that obligation must consist of more than predictions 
about the likelihood of suffering negative consequences for disobeying). 
207 Id. at 86. To distinguish law from morality or social convention, Hart merely 
makes distinctions in the type of punishment or consequences that flow from 
disregarding a precept. Thus, law, morality, and social convention for Hart only 
differ in the nature of punishments related thereto. 
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the provision by Eternal Law for rational determinations of 
Natural Law by human authorities.  Rather than deriving an 
obligation to obey from the existence of a legitimate threat of 
punishment, the classical theory derives the legitimacy of a 
threat of punishment from the presence of a legitimate obligation 
to obey.  Legal authorities can threaten consequences because 
they possess legitimate authority delegated to them to create the 
obligation which will later be coupled with a threat.  Punishment 
derives from obligation not vice-versa. 
To distinguish this power to obligate from the demand of a 
gunman, it is necessary to recognize that unlike the gunman’s, 
the legal authority’s power is delegated from above.  The legal 
authority’s power originates in the power to guide toward the 
development of virtue and to make determinations of Natural 
Law provided by God.  Since all humans share an equal human 
nature—although differing in accidentals to that nature—no 
person can confer authority to command on another person as 
both are equal in nature.  Authority must come from a superior. 
Hart recognizes this need when he argues that a legal system 
must have a supreme lawmaker from whom subordinated 
lawmakers receive their authority.208  The indeterminacy of 
Natural Law as provided for in the plan of the Eternal Law 
provides for the delegation of authority from a superior.  Beyond 
this important distinction, the lawmaker’s command must not 
only be a product of a delegated authority but it must also be a 
product of reason—a deduction or determination of Natural 
Law—whereas the gunman’s demand is the product solely of his 
will and need not be rational.  The exercise of legal authority 
involves the making of rational deductions or determinations of 
the rational principles of Natural Law and is thus an act not only 
of the will but of the intellect.  Yet, since after the Fall law serves 
208 Id. at 24–25. Hart erroneously goes further to demand independence as well 
as a supreme lawmaker. Certainly he is correct to note that for one particular legal 
system—England—to be distinct from another—Russia—the supreme lawmaker in 
England must be independent of the one of Russia. Yet, it does not follow from this 
conclusion that both the supreme lawmaker of England and Russia cannot each be 
independently subordinate to a lawmaker above both of them who has severally 
delegated a limited authority—within the respective countries—to exercise internal 
to that system the supreme legislative power still subject in turn to the overarching 
supreme lawmaker. Admitting such a dependence of both countries on a higher 
authority does not destroy the independence of England and Russia from each other 
pursuant to their separate delegation. 
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the purpose of guiding the subjection of the disordered passions 
to the intellect, it also must involve a coercive act of the will.  The 
absence of both intellectual and volitional elements renders a 
purported act of a lawmaker nothing other than an act of 
violence.209  When the necessary rational connection to Natural 
Law is removed, the lawmaker becomes merely Hart’s gunman, 
notwithstanding his possession of titles suggesting legitimate 
authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike Finnis’s utilitarian rationale for the existence of 
human law that ought to be obeyed, traditional Natural Law 
jurisprudence understands the making of particular human laws 
to be a good in and of itself because the authority is fulfilling a 
purpose established by the Eternal Law.  Human lawmaking is 
not merely instrumentally good as a useful means to coordinating 
group actions.  Contra Finnis, the justification of authority 
defended in this Article holds that authority, the choice or 
election among possible legal determinations of Natural Law 
precepts, is a good in and of itself because it is legislated into the 
system by the Eternal Law which provides that such 
determinations ought to be made by those with care of the 
community.  Making human laws is thus a participation in God’s 
governance of the universe which God has entrusted to Men.  As 
an aspect of God’s nature, authority thus is a good in its own 
right and not merely an instrumental good to solve a 
coordination problem.  Finnis bases the need for authoritative 
rulers on a requirement for “speed and certainty” that is not 
provided by a coordination solution by custom.210  At his most 
utilitarian, he says, “Authority (and thus the responsibility of 
governing) in a community is to be exercised by those who can in 
fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for that 
community.”211  Particular authorities may vary widely in their 
effectiveness in performing their task, but the activity has value 
regardless because it is a participation in God’s law making.  For 
this reason, St. Thomas Aquinas held that one could not be 
removed from an office of legal authority simply for making bad 
209 See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 33, at I-II, Q. 96, art. 4. 
210 FINNIS, supra note 68, at 245–46. 
211 Id. at 246. 
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laws.212  A tyrannical prince may be participating poorly in God’s 
authority but that does not detract from the goodness of that 
authority itself. 
Grounding human authority in the Eternal Law provides the 
only answer to what Steven Smith has called law’s quandary: 
Does the law exist or is it only a conceptual construct?213  
Utilitarian and consent or popular sovereignty theories might 
say something about law or something about why some people 
obey it, but none of them provides answers to the big question.  If 
law and legal authority really exist, from where did they come? 
As Joseph Vining has commented about Smith’s work, the 
classical view of law running from the ancient world through 
Christian jurisprudence maintained that the key to the big 
question lay in the divine.  Vining observes, “Smith begins with 
an overarching sense of law, ‘classical’ or ‘traditional,’ preceding 
the developments of the twentieth century.  One view, which he 
outlines, is that this overarching sense depended upon and 
linked human law to divine law with divine judgment and 
sanction.”214  The modern break with this ontology created a 
metaphysical problem which the modern theories of authority fail 
to solve satisfactorily.  John Finnis resists relying on this 
classical understanding of law and its grounding of authority and 
obligation in God.  He seems to believe that unless he removes 
God from the explanation of authority and obligation, his 
argument can be defeated by the question:  “Why should we obey 
God?”215  Yet, that question can be answered in the same way 
that one would answer the question of a worker on a building 
site:  “Why should we obey the architect?”  The answer is because 
the architect has in his mind the entire plan and can see better 
than the individual builder the purpose of his particular action 
and how it fits into the overall structure.  Ultimately, God should 
be obeyed not simply because, in the words of Michael Moore, he 
is some “Big Person.”216  As Patrick Brennan has observed, the 
Thomistic definition of law does not contain an element of 
coercion.217  Obedience to the law is not a result of law being 
212 See AQUINAS, DE REGNO, supra note 136, at Bk. I, ch. VI, 31–33. 
213 See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (Harv. Univ. Press 2004). 
214 Vining, supra note 1, at 700 (referring to SMITH, supra note 213, at 47). 
215 Id. 
216 Moore, supra note 61, at 235. 
217 Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Legislation and Rules a Problem in Law? 
Thoughts on the Work of Joseph Vining, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1191, 1214 (2010). 
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coercive.  Some forms of coercion may be justified once an 
obligation to obey the law has been established.  But this use of 
coercion is a consequence of legitimate authority, not a 
constituent of it.  Ultimately, we should obey God’s law because 
the world is objectively rational, and He is the source of that 
rationality.  He can see the entire architecture and thus we 
should obey Him.  This rational obligation to obey God’s law is 
the source of the rational obligation to obey the authorities He 
has permitted to participate in His lawmaking, by entrusting 
them with perfecting his architectural design by making 
particular determination. 
Recognizing the necessity of God in the foundation of legal 
authority raises the question:  Should Natural Law theory be 
articulated so that it depends upon belief in God?  Some may fear 
losing an audience for the argument over this issue.  There are 
two possibilities to avoid God’s fundamental role in legal 
authority.  Either deny his necessity or reduce that necessity to 
virtually nothing.  The first solution leads to the dead end 
justifications of utilitarianism and consent theory.  As discussed 
in Part I of this Article, the attempts to justify legal authority 
without God have all failed to present a cogent, complete, and 
satisfactory explanation for the ontology and origin of legal 
authority.  For those who wish to diminish the central role of God 
in the origin of law and legal authority, they likewise end up in 
an unsatisfactory conclusion.  Patrick Brennan vividly describes 
the bleak world of legal theory built on Deist’s notions of a 
minimalist God: 
The world to which the Deist would consign us looks like this. 
On the one hand, irrational, unfree creatures—such as puppies 
and petunias—would be infallibly moved by God through their 
created inclinations to their respective ends.  Rational human 
creatures, on the other hand, would suffer their inclinations to 
their end(s), alright, but would enjoy no authoritative measure 
for freely achieving them.  What this would mean, in other 
words, is that the creator created with the certainty that his 
rational creatures would not, absent divine intervention (as in 
Scripture), be commanded to the end(s) for which God created 
them.  Created by God but not commanded by God, to vary 
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Hittinger’s phrase.  Or, to vary the phrase yet again, no 
measures, or rules, or law imposed by another by which to 
choose and act.  Kant celebrated the putative result as 
“autonomy.”  But is this true?218 
For this reason, Brennan argues that the very notion of law and 
legal authority must be based on presuppositions about God: 
And here the connection with religion, the work to make law 
heard proceeds only on presuppositions.  If it does not proceed 
on those presuppositions, it does not produce anything to which 
there is any sense of obligation.  That which evokes no sense of 
obligation is not law.  It is only an appearance of law, the 
legalistic, the authoritarian, not sovereign but an enemy. 
Principal among the presuppositions of legal work are that a 
person speaks through the texts; that there is mind; that mind 
is caring mind.  These are the links between the experience of 
law and religious experience219 
One need not accept everything that theology teaches about God 
to find the origin of authority in Him.220  Yet, at least one must 
recognize God as a God of law, a Person who orders the universe 
with authority and entrusts a portion of that authority to 
rational creatures to do likewise.  Only here can we find not only 
a satisfactory explanation of authority—an answer to the 
question why the fallible determinations of other fallible rational 
creatures should be obeyed as law by us—but we can also regain 
a humanized authority.  If law is only words and text, then as 
Brennan observes, it easily becomes authoritarian.  If law is in a 
rational mind, it can resist authoritarianism.  Locating human 
legal authority within the person of God secures limits to the 
exercise of that authority by human minds and the duty to obey 
the laws they produce.  Proving this claim is beyond the scope of 
this single Article. 
Finally, the Natural Law explanation satisfies Leslie Green’s 
requirements for an authority that can obligate obedience to 
laws.  The Natural Law provides a moral reason—in the sense of 
a reason independent of the human law itself—for action—
218 Id. at 1210. 
219 Id. at 1207. 
220 Note that failure to accept all that God reveals about Himself and His law 
will lead to an incomplete and fractured account of Natural Law. Thus, although 
acceptance of the classical Natural Law thesis does not depend on the acceptance of 
all aspects of revealed theology but only natural theology, the result of failing to 
integrate revealed theology will be incomplete and imperfect. 
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condition (i)—because the Natural Law entrusts to human 
authorities the responsibility to determine particular action to be 
done or avoided pursuant to its own general precepts.  Thus, the 
precept of Natural Law that individuals are to live well in society 
obligates us to conform to the determinations of applicable 
authorities independently of those determinations themselves. 
The foregoing justification of legal authority provides a content-
independent reason for action—condition (ii)—because the 
general precepts of Natural Law permit for a variety of possible 
conforming determinations and the particular one to be obeyed is 
to be obeyed because the applicable authority in fact so 
determined.  Subjects do not obey human laws because all things 
considered, they would have selected this particular 
determination of Natural Law.  They must obey because Natural 
Law has delegated election of this type of determination to 
human authorities.  Stephen Perry argues that to satisfy 
condition (ii), we must not refer to an independent moral 
obligation to do X but rather only to the legal directive to do X.221  
If we parse more precisely what we mean by X, we can see how a 
human law requiring citizens to do X is content independent 
under the Natural Law understanding of law.  For example, the 
human law requiring one to drive on the right side of the road is 
rooted in the obligation under Natural Law to drive safely, but 
the specific obligation to do such by driving on the right side as 
opposed to the left is dependent solely on the determination by a 
human lawmaker even if that determination derives its 
obligatory force from a more general precept of Natural Law. 
Prior to the drive on the right law being enacted, each person is 
free to conform to the general precept of driving safely by making 
individual determinations about which side appears to be the 
safest in the particular context.  Yet, once the determination is 
made by human law, all drivers must drive on the right because 
the lawmaker has now made the determination for the 
community.  Punishment for murder provides another example. 
The Natural Law obligates one not to murder, but the obligation 
to be confined to prison for life if one murders is obligatory once a 
human authority has determined a life sentence to be the 
punishment due to those who commit murder.  Although rooted 
both in the Natural Law precepts prohibiting murder and 
221 Perry, supra note 28, at 14–15. 
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requiring evildoers to be punished, the specific nature of the 
punishment is content independent as it arises from the 
legitimate determination of the authority in selecting this 
particular punishment.  Human law provides a binding or 
mandatory reason for action—condition (iii)—because God 
through Natural Law delegates the power to determine Natural 
Law to human authorities.  The mandatory nature of legitimate 
human determinations thus derives from the mandatory nature 
of the ends of human existence established in the Eternal Law. 
Although the election of means in relation to that end is left to 
human choice, it is not always left to each individual for all 
choices.  Some determinations are left to the superiors of 
families, imperfect communities, and perfect communities.  Yet, 
the power to determine is derived from the Eternal Law.  Human 
law is a particular reason for action only for the directives of a 
citizen’s, or subject’s, own state—condition (iv)—because Natural 
Law entrusts determination not to one superior but to a variety 
of temporal and spiritual superiors dispersed throughout the 
variety of perfect communities around the globe.  The various 
imperfect and perfect communities are constituted by nature 
with their own particular superiors entrusted with a specific 
jurisdictional limit for making determinations for their particular 
community.  As argued in a prior article, those determinations 
can legitimately differ from community to community and still be 
derived from the same Natural Law precept.222  The developing 
customs of each community will result in different but still 
legitimate determinations of the same Natural Law precept. 
Finally, a particular determination is a universal reason for 
action—condition (v)—because it binds all of those subject to the 
applicable authority to all determinations of that authority. 
Unlike Raz’s theory, the classical theory requires universal 
conformity even when individuals might deem the determination 
unnecessary in a particular case.  Many theorists have argued 
that this universality condition can never be met as in every 
society there will at some point be a law that should not be 
obeyed.223  At some point, another normative principle demands 
disobedience to a law.  Such a conclusion is necessitated by 
restricting the idea of legal system to human-made laws.  Thus, 
222 See McCall, supra note 139. 
223 Perry, supra note 28, at 12. 
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when a human-made law must be disobeyed, it appears to lack 
legal universality.  Yet, if the legal system is larger than the 
determinations by human authorities to include the Natural 
Law, when those determinations that cannot be obeyed are 
encountered individuals still conform their actions to the law in 
its fullest sense.  Subjects are only bound in conscience to obey 
determinations of the Natural Law.  If a human authority 
commands something other than a valid determination of 
Natural Law it is not a law at all.  Thus, if human law is defined 
to include only those acts of lawgivers that are in fact laws, the 
universality condition is satisfied.  Those acts of lawgivers that 
may be disregarded are not laws because they are invalidated by 
higher law.  Yet, to prove this last point, we must examine more 
carefully the limits on human law-making authority conferred by 
the Natural Law.  A subsequent article will argue that once this 
limitation is understood, the legitimate disregarding of a human 
made law can be seen not as a moral objection to a legal 
obligation resulting in disobedience to law; it is a legal objection 
based on the resolution of a conflict of laws and the purported 
disobedience is rather an act of obedience to higher law. 
